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In many low-resource settings agricultural output and public spending on agriculture are in 
decline, raising questions about the effectiveness of agricultural aid. To understand why these 
trends are occurring, we examined factors that affect the share of government spending on 
agriculture. Using a sample of 66 low- and middle-income countries from 1996-2010 we use 
dynamic panel regression models to explore: (1) the impact of agricultural aid on public 
expenditure to agriculture, and (2) the impact of aid on domestic resource mobilisation, which 
indirectly affects public expenditures. Our results provide evidence of a strong substitution 
effect, especially in low-income countries, suggesting aid to agriculture is treated as fungible. 
We also found evidence that aid loans resulted in higher tax revenues, while aid grants 
decreased tax effort, which may account for decreasing public investment in agriculture. To 
improve aid effectiveness, donors need to work with recipients to understand country needs and 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Area 
Agriculture remains the single most important sector for ensuring socio-economic development 
in a majority of low- and middle-income countries. Over and above the significance of 
agriculture in addressing food insecurity, agriculture is a major contributor to the national 
income of low- and middle-income countries. In particular, agriculture accounts for 20-60% of 
GDP , employs  up to 65% of the labour force in low- and middle-income countries and as a 
result provides livelihood for approximately 2.6 billion people globally (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Therefore, a focus on agriculture driven development strategies is imperative in the socio-
economic development of low and middle-income countries (DFID, 2004).  
 
Expenditure in agriculture is considered an important public instrument for extracting the cross-
sectoral benefits of an investment in agriculture (Akroy & Smith, 2007). However, over the last 
three decades the public expenditures to agriculture have on average decreased, with agriculture 
as a share of total public expenditures decreasing from 11% in 1980 to 7% in 2002 (Islam, 
2011). Decreasing public commitment to agriculture has been argued to be the cause of the 
reduction in agricultural production which has subsequently threatened global food security 
(Mogues et al., 2012). For example, between 1996 and 2010, the number of people suffering 
from chronic hunger increased by about 13% to over one billion and may be expected to 
increase further based on expected population increases (UNCTAD, 2010).  
 
Looking forward, based on current trends, it is estimated that developing countries require an 
additional US$9.2 trillion of agriculture investment to meet projected demand for agricultural 
products by 2050 (Schmidhuber, Bruinsma & Boedeker, 2009). In light of the immensity of 
required public expenditure to agriculture, donors have refocused their commitment to 
agriculture. For instance, bilateral aid to agriculture increased on average by 13% annually 
between 2003 and 2008 (DAC, 2010). However, donors have increasingly questioned the 
effectiveness of aid to agriculture. For instance, despite an increase aid to agriculture of 74% 
between 2000 and 2008 the recent world food crises occurred in late 2008 (Coppard, 2010). 
More specifically, donors have become increasingly concerned with how recipient 
governments mediate the inflow of aid through its fiscal behaviour. These concerns have 
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traditionally centred on fungibility, the potential for recipient governments to use aid received 
for purposes not intended by donors. The potential for governments to treat agricultural aid as 
fungible reduces much needed investment into agriculture therefore undermining the 
development impact of agricultural aid. This is especially a concern for countries in which 
donor funding is a sizable proportion of total agricultural spending (World Bank, 1998).  
 
Given the importance of agricultural aid in developing countries, this paper seeks to investigate 
the impact of these flows on government expenditure and ultimately provides policy 
recommendations on how aid to agriculture should be employed and managed. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
One of the main mediums through which aid influences aid outcomes is through its increase of 
recipient public expenditures. However previous studies have found that the additionality of 
aid can be undermined by the potential for aid recipients to treat aid as fungible. For sectors 
such as agriculture that are in desperate need of additional funding this may lead to continued 
under investment in the sector. These findings  have subsequently influenced donor aid policies 
on how to disburse as well as evaluate development assistance. In order to increase aid 
effectiveness, donors shy away from allocating funds toward countries that have evidence of 
aid fungibility. Instead, donors prefer to give aid to countries with good governance, as they 
argue such countries are less likely to divert aid toward uses not intended by governments (Pack 
& Pack, 1993; World Bank, 1998).  
 
However, Pettersson (2007) argues that policy recommendations should rather consider how 
fungible funds are used, and whether or not fungible funds are more productive than non-
fungible funds. He argues that fungibility is not necessarily a precursor to a government having 
bad policies, as he found a positive correlation between sound economic policies and aid 
fungibility. These findings suggest measures of fungibility are unable to discriminate between 
governments with good and those with bad policies. In addition, (Mcgillivray & Morrissey, 
2000, 2001) point out that the focus on fungibility distracts from the more fundamental issue 
of how aid impacts on fiscal aggregates. As such, the authors advocate for the use of fiscal 
response studies to examine the broader fiscal impacts of aid especially on governments own 
revenue raising efforts, more specifically on tax and borrowing. This is due to rising concerns 
that increasing shares of aid in government income may have actually resulted distorting 
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incentives for governments to in domestic resource mobilisation(Gupta et al., 2003). This may 
have important implication for the agriculture sector, which is dependent on both aid as well as 
tax revenue raised in other sectors. This is because the agriculture sector in developing countries 
cannot directly levy tax in the sector given the high portion of poor smallholder farmers.   
 
The link between aid to agriculture and public expenditure may not be simply fixed by 
employing policy recommendations that advocate discriminating against disbursing aid to 
countries that are likely to treat aid as fungible. White and Lensink (1998) echoes this sentiment 
noting that this policy of selectivity, may lead to potential beneficiaries of agricultural aid not 
receiving aid on account of donors pre-emptively assuming that they would treat aid as fungible. 
It may be that aid fungibility may rather be symptomatic of other issues such as the 
misalignment of donor and recipient preferences. In addition, aid inflows into aid dependent 
governments may crowd out revenue raising efforts, which may further undermine the 
additionality of agricultural aid on agricultural public expenditure.  
 
1.3 Purpose and Significance of the Research 
To our knowledge there have been few cross country studies that have specifically investigated 
the impact of aid on the agriculture sector. In particular, we identified two gaps in the aid 
fungibility and fiscal response literature. First, in his cross country study (fifty seven countries) 
of the influence of governance on fungibility Pettersson (2007) did not analyse the fungibility 
of aid to agriculture in isolation but rather  aggregated agricultural aid with other sectors 
including energy, and transportation. Second, within fiscal response studies no study had 
specifically analysed the fiscal effects of aid on a subset of aid dependent developing countries 
in which agriculture is a significant portion of the economy.  
 
It is against this backdrop that this study undertook a panel analysis of a sample of developing 
countries to evaluate the incidence and the influence of quality of governance on fungibility in 
the agriculture sector. In addition to assessing the impact of total aid on tax revenue on sample 
of largely agrarian based developing countries. The results of the study aimed to provide 
additional understanding into the impact of aid both at the sectoral and national level on 
agricultural expenditures and in so doing recommend possible policies that would increase the 
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1.4 Research Questions and Scope 
 
This study aimed to conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of aid (total and agricultural) 
on agricultural public expenditures, by answering the following research question: 
 
1. To what extent is aid to the agricultural sector fungible in low and middle-income 
countries (LMIC)? 
2. Are LMICs with poor governance more likely to have fungible aid in the agriculture 
sector? 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 An overview of the Concept of Agricultural Public Expenditure  
 
For the purposes of this paper, agricultural public expenditures refers to government spending 
on items classified under the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) developed 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). More specifically, 
agricultural public expenditures or public expenditures to agriculture refer to expenditure to 
core areas of government functions relevant to the agriculture sector. These  include 
“agriculture” (crops and livestock), “forestry” (forest crops and timber), and “fishing” (fishing 
and hunting for commercial and sport purposes) (OECD, 2011). Please see Appendix A for 
more detailed descriptions of public agricultural expenditures included under the COFOG. 
 
The fundamental rationale for public expenditure in the agricultural sector rests firmly on 
addressing market failures and increasing the overall economic welfare in the sector. Mogues 
et al. (2012) argue that market failures in the agriculture sector are ubiquitous in developing 
countries given the capital goods needed in the sector are characterised by non-rivalry and 
excludability rendering them public goods. This is to say, capital needed in the sector requires 
high investments in research and technology in which investors cannot restrict the consumption 
of these goods and as such cannot derive compensation from market participants that benefit 
from the investment. In developing countries especially where the enforceability of intellectual 
property rights is weak, private investors are unable to protect their intellectual property e.g. 
patents and therefore are unable to fully reap the reward of their investments (Watal, 1999; 
Spielman & Cavalieri, 2010). In light of this, the private sector in developing countries shies 
away from agricultural investments for which public investment is then needed to develop the 
sector. In addition to efficiency concerns, public expenditures in the agriculture sector 
especially in developing countries are needed to improve the welfare of farmers who are largely 
poorest of the population and rely on substance smallholder farming as a means of survival 
(Akroy & Smith, 2007; Mogues, 2012). Though various mechanisms such direct cash transfers, 
producer cost subsidies, investments in improving the productivity of farmer or public service 
provision, government expenditures are needed to develop the agriculture sector which is 
currently at the mercy of poor smallholder farmers and a lack of private sector investment. 
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2.1.1 Trends of Public Expenditure to Agriculture (1980-2010) 
 
Despite the importance of public expenditure to the agriculture sectors, numerous studies have 
found that over the last three decades public expenditure in developing countries has 
increased(Fan & Rao, 2003; Akroy & Smith, 2007; Fan, Omilola & Lambert, 2009; Mogues et 
al., 2012). For instance, in their study of forty four developing countries Mogues et al., (2012) 
found that public expenditure increased six fold from $ 821 billion in 1980 to $ 4 932 billion in 
2007.Similarly, the authors found that the ratio of public spending relative the size of the 
economy (as a percentage of GDP) increased from 17% in 1980 to 20% in 2007.  
 
In line with the observed increases in public expenditures, Mogues et al., (2012) found that 
between 1980 and 2007 on average public expenditure in agriculture  increased by  6.1 % 
annually. In addition, the authors found that per capita public expenditure in agriculture more 
than doubled over the period, having increased from $20 in 1980 to $44 in 2007. However, 
Breisinger & Fan (2011) argue that if one observes the relative share of agriculture in total 
public expenditure then actually public expenditures to agriculture has decreased over time. For 
example, the authors found that despite real increases in public expenditures in East Asia and 
the Pacific, the share of agriculture in public expenditure decreased from 10% in 1980 to 6.1% 
in 2007.This view is also supported by Fan & Saurkar (2008) who found in a study of forty four 
developing countries that the share of public expenditure as proportion of total public spending  
declined from over 11% in 1980 to under 7% in 2002. Breisinger & Fan (2011) further argue 
that an even more insightful measure of public fiscal support of is agriculture expenditure 
intensity, which measures public agricultural expenditure relative to the size of the sector in the 
economy (agricultural GDP). The authors found that regions with the highest food security 
concerns had the lowest observed levels of agricultural expenditure intensity as compared to 
other developing regions. In particular, Breisinger & Fan (2011) found that in 2007, agricultural 
expenditure intensity in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa was only 2.8% and 3.3% 
respectively, which was a third of the agricultural expenditure intensity observed in East Asia 
and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. In line with 
these findings, Fan & Saurkar (2008) also found in their cross-country study albeit using a 
bigger sample (70 countries) that the agricultural expenditure intensity in 2007 was less than 
10 % in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, which is half the  agricultural expenditure intensity 
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Some authors have argued that the decline in agriculture public expenditure in developing 
countries is a legacy of the post-independence focus on industrialization which led to under 
investments in agriculture (Fan & Saurkar, 2008; Breisinger & Fan, 2011; Mogues, 2012; 
Mogues et al., 2012). This may have been further exasperated by the structural adjustment 
programs introduced in the 1980s which saw the international community advocating for 
developing countries to induced national budget cuts which negatively impacted public 
expenditures including in the agricultural sector (Fan & Rao, 2003). Alternatively, the decline 
in public expenditures may also signal a shift in government priorities and even possibly shifts 
in the economic structures of governments, which can be seen in the increase in the share of 
other sectors in total expenditures.  For example, (Fan & Saurkar, 2008) found that in spite of 
the decreasing share of agriculture in total expenditures, spending to education increased in 
sub-Saharan Africa , Latin America, and Asia by 2%, 4% and 2% respectively. However, there 
may be some inconsistencies with this argument given that the agriculture sector still accounts 
for a significant portion of developing country economic sector. This can be seen for instance 
in sub-Saharan Africa where agriculture output was found to contribute approximately 30% of 
total GDP in 2007. 
 
Another increasingly emerging school of thought in the literature is that development assistance 
provided to developing countries may adversely impact the incentives of recipients to 
increasing public expenditures. This is especially in light of the fact that despite developing 
countries being significant recipients of foreign aid since the 1970s, a number of sectors such 
as agriculture have experienced declining public expenditures. For example during the mid- to 
late-1990s aid inflows were found to account for half of all public expenditures in low-income 
countries (World Bank, 2001). Even more so, countries that are recovering from conflicts have 
even higher ratios such as Liberia which had development assistance contribute 78 % to its 
gross national income in 2008 (World Bank, 2011).  
 
In the proceeding section we aim to explore this line of reasoning in more detail by reviewing 
the findings of past studies that have aimed to investigate the impact of development assistance 
flows on public expenditures in developing countries. We first begin with an overview of the 
concept of aid, followed by review of observed trends of agriculture aid and finally present 
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2.2 Overview of Official Aid to Agriculture  
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Aid and Aid to Agriculture 
 
There currently exists ambiguity over the definition of ‘aid’, development assistance that is 
provided to recipient governments from foreign donors. This ambiguity largely stems from the 
lack of consensus on what kinds of foreign transfer of resources should be included within the 
definition of aid. For example some definitions vary in their inclusions of line items such as 
military assistance, emergency humanitarian relief and soft loans disbursed to low-income 
countries (Lancaster, 2000). One standard definition of aid which is used both in literature as 
well by development institutions, is the definition offered by the Development Assistance 
Corporation (DAC) the development arm of the Organisation for Economic Development and 
Corporation (OECD). 
 
DAC refers to aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA) when a donor government or 
multi lateral institution disburses financial flows to eligible countries on the DAC’s list of ODA 
recipients or multilateral development institutions (OECD, 2008a). Drawing from United 
Nations (UN) and the World Bank country classifications, the list of recipient countries consists 
of least developed countries (LDCs), low middle-income countries (LMICs), upper-middle-
income countries (UMICs) and high-income countries (HICs). LDC’s refer to countries that in 
2013 their Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was less than $816. LMICs, UMICs, and 
HICs refer to countries whose GNI in 2010 was in between the specified income bands of, $0 
-$ 1 005; $1 006-$3 975: and $3 976-$12 275 respectively. As it currently stands, there are 147 
countries that are eligible for ODA which are predominantly found in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. DAC further qualifies that for ODA to be valid it must fulfil three further 
requirements namely,   
 
i. ODA must be provided by official agencies which includes state governments or their  
associated executive agencies;  
ii. ODA must be disbursed with the main objective of promoting economic and welfare 
development in developing countries (referred to as country eligible for ODA) 
iii. Each ODA transaction must be concessional in nature and consist of a minimum of 
25% grant funding. 
 
9 
Ritta Shine _SHNRIT001 
DAC aggregates and reports aid flows at activity levels using their Creditor Reporting System. 
DAC defines aid to agriculture strictly include all aid flows disbursed toward the subsectors of 
“agriculture”, “forestry” and “fishing” collectively categorised under AFF (Agriculture, 
Fishing and Forestry) (DAC, 2010) . The full definition of each AFF subsector is provided in 
Appendix B. The DAC definition of aid to agriculture excludes aid flows that may be argued 
to effect food security such as rural development and emergency food aid, which may distort 
perception of trends of aid flows toward food security / agriculture (DAC, 2010)- an issue that 
is explained further in the proceeding section.  
 
For the purposes of this paper ‘aid to agriculture’ or ‘agricultural aid’ will refer to the DAC 
definition of aid. In addition, “aid” will refer to the official definition of aid endorsed by DAC 
whilst the term “developing countries” will refer to countries eligible for ODA.  
2.2.2 Trend of Official Aid Flows (ODA) to agriculture (1980-2012) 
 
According to Lowder & Carisma (2011),  although total aid increased nearly 6 fold from 1973 
to 140 billion USD in 2009, the share of agriculture as a portion of total aid decreased from 
1980 to the mid to late 2000s. Qualifying this point is the findings offered by Islam, (2011) 
that aid to agriculture as a proportion of total aid continuously decreased from a peak of 23 % 
between1979-1981 to 5.5 % during 2003-2005. The declining trend of agricultural aid has been 
largely attributed to the shifting priorities of donors over time and emergence of new claimants 
to development assistance. Firstly, aid was found to be increasingly channelled toward social 
infrastructure where aid to education and health increasing from 9% in 1980 to 33% in 2002 
(Arnold, Morrision & Bezemer, 2004). This may be due to the donors increasing investments 
in sectors in which there is a direct association of aid investment and development outcomes 
especially in the short term. Social infrastructure for instance may potentially reap much 
quicker development outcomes in the present such as increasing basic health and education. In 
contrast, developmental outcomes from agricultural aid are predominately achieved in the long 
run e.g. research and development (Mogues et al., 2012). Secondly, the competition for 
agricultural aid has intensified with the emergence of new development assistance areas, more 
specifically, humanitarian aid due to unforeseen and debt relief debt burdened poor countries. 
For example, the share of debt relief in total aid commitments more than doubled since 1980, 
while shares of emergency assistance  increased to 6.5% from  a previous low of 0.6% in 1980 
(Arnold, Morrision & Bezemer, 2004). 
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There is largely consensus in the literature that from the mid to late 2000s the declining trend 
of agricultural aid was significantly reversed. More specifically, aid to agriculture in absolute 
terms (2009 constant US$) doubled to almost $8 billion in 2009 from the mid-2000s, therefore 
increasing ODA to agriculture as a share of total ODA from 4 percent in  mid-2000s to 6 % in 
2009 (Breisinger & Fan, 2011). The recent increase in agricultural aid has been largely 
attributed to the response of donors to the global food crises of 2007/8 that led to over 1 billion 
people suffering from extreme food insecurity and poverty (Benin, 2014).  
 
The substantial increase in aid to agriculture has come at a time in which the concept of 
‘additionality’ is increasingly being included in aid effectiveness paradigms. This is inline with 
aid effectiveness literature which asserts that one of the main impact channels of development 
assistance on the wider economy is its contribution to public development expenditures 
(Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008, 2009). This sentiment can be seen in recent multi national 
agreements such as the Paris Declaration in 2005, that emphasized amongst that aid should 
result in increased efforts to mobilise domestic resources (OECD, 2008b).  Therefore, aid is at 
minimum expected to result in an increase in public expenditure in sectors or projects by the 
amount of aid disbursed by donors and in accordance to donor preferences. However, aid may 
distort the incentives of government and unintentionally produce a series of macroeconomic 
effects over and above those expected by donors. For example, aid may finance non-
developmental expenditures or disincentive recipient governments from revenue raising or debt 
reduction efforts.  
 
Within aid effectiveness literature, studies focusing on the fiscal impact of aid can be divided 
into two distinct subcategories. The first is, aid fungibility literature which focuses on whether 
recipient governments spend aid as intended by donors. Whilst the second, fiscal response 
literature concentrates on how aid inflows impacts various public financing sources and 
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2.3 Aid Fungibility 
2.3.1 The Theory of Fiscal Response of Aid 
 
Aid is fungible when recipient governments intentionally divert ODA disbursed from donors   
toward uses other than those intended by donors (Pack & Pack, 1993; Feyzioglu, Swaroop & 
Zhu, 1998; World Bank, 1998; Mcgillivray & Morrissey, 2001; Pettersson, 2007; Farag et al., 
2009; Marc, 2012). Specifically, aid is fungible if it is perceived as additional revenue by 
recipient governments which they can use at their own will (Khilji & Zampelli, 1994). As such, 
the major concern of aid fungibility stems from debate on whether aid disbursed to a recipient 
government can be used as additional income which the recipient government can freely utilize 
in accordance to their preferences. It is argued that when aid is fungible the development impact 
of aid is undermined given that  recipient government may divert  aid toward consumption of 
non-development expenditures which may be less productive, for example on defence 
expenditures (Pettersson, 2007). Given that aid comprises a large component of total 
government revenue in most developing countries today, fungibility is increasingly influencing 
aid policy recommendations on how and to whom aid should be disbursed especially 
(Mcgillivray & Morrissey, 2000).  
 
Previous authors have further broken down the concept of fungibility to account for the  varying 
degrees of  fungibility, where  aid can be either be fully, partially or non fungible when either 
all or a portion of aid is diverted toward other uses.  
 
Assuming that a recipient government only spends on two activities, R and S,  Mcgillivray & 
Morrissey (2000)  illustrate the different degrees of fungibility as provided in Figure 1a. Prior 
to receiving aid, a government would allocate expenditures between activities R and S at point 
X. X is the point at which budget line B and indifference curve I meet. Indifference curve I 
represents government preferences on expenditure allocation between R and S , whereby 
increased proportion of expenditure on R is represented by movements downward along the 
curve , whilst increased expenditure on S is represented by upward along the curve. Therefore, 
point X as asserted by Mcgillivray & Morrissey (2000) represent, ‘ the optimum, maximising 
government utility subject to a budget constraint’. Suppose a donor disburses aid amounting to 
A to a government with the intention that it be used on R however aid is disbursed to the central 
budget of the country therefore the total budget increases by A, represented by an outward shift 
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of the budget line to B’.  Given that aid was disbursed to the central budget, government sees 
aid as additional income to the budget which it will be used in accordance to its preference. 
Therefore, although the donor expected the total budget for R to increase by the full amount of 
aid at point X’(R+A), the government maximises its utility at Y, where it allocates A to both R 
and S, with spending on R increasing by R’ not R+ A. Therefore the preferences of the recipient 
government determine the level of fungibility, whereby for any given set of indifference curve 
the new optimum allocation would at any point along B’.  Full fungibility is therefore whereby 
there is a total misalignment of  recipient government preferences from those of donors and all 
aid is diverted to other uses, in this case all aid received is spent on S, such that pre-aid optimum 
allocation shifts from point X to point Y’. Contrastingly, aid is non fungible when government 
and donor priorities fully align resulting in aid being used for its intended purposes, which in 
Figure 1 is whereby the government uses all aid on R and the optimal allocation of expenditure 
would be at X’ , as intended by donors).  
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In the case of partial fungibility, as depicted in Figure 1b , the donor does restrict the use of aid 
by trying to tie  it to a particular project or component of the total budget e.g. agriculture. The 
restriction of aid to earmarked results in only a portion of aid being fungible, as illustrated in 
Figure 2 by truncating the budget line B’ at Y’, therefore limiting the recipients to allocating to 
S’’ to S and R’’ to R. This prevents the recipient government from its optimum expenditure 
allocation at  of point Y which would mean expenditure on R is more aligned to donor priorities 
at R’’ instead of R’. Although this allocation is less than the optimal when aid is non fungible 
at X’, it more favourable than Y’ in figure 1 where aid is fully fungible i.e. only a portion of 
the aid is fungible.  
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2.3.2 Empirical Findings of Aid Fungibility 
 
Previous research has studied fungibility mainly through two channels, at the macro (aggregate) 
and meso (sector) level (Farag et al., 2009). At the macro level, aid is fungible when each unit 
of aid results in a less than proportionate increase in total public expenditure, with aid being 
diverted to other uses such as private consumption and non-development expenditures etc. At 
the meso  level, aid is fungible when aid disbursed for one sector is used in another  sector or 
for uses  not intended by donors e.g. aid for education is diverted toward health expenditures 
or private consumption.  
 
At the macro level, cross-country studies have failed to reach a consensus on the levels of aid 
fungibility experienced in developing countries. For example, in a cross sectional study of 
fourteen countries, Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu (1998)found that aid disbursed from 1970 to 
1990 was not fungible. However within the same paper, using an extended sample size of thirty 
eight countries they found ODA over the same period was partially fungible, with a dollar of 
aid received resulting in an increase of $0.33 in total government spending. Additionally, 
Chatterjee, Giuliano & Kaya, (2007) study of 67 countries over the period of 1972 to 2000, 
found that about $0.70 of every dollar of foreign aid is fungible. The disparity of cross country 
results may be due to indications that fungibility may be country specific. To illustrate, aid was 
found to be fully fungible in  India (Swaroop, Jha & Sunil, 2000) and Dominican Republic 
(Pack & Pack, 1993), partially fungible in Sri Lanka (Pack & Pack, 1998) and not fungible in 
Indonesia (Pack & Pack, 1990).  
 
Similar to aggregate fungibility studies, at the sectoral level, aid fungibility studies have also 
yielded conflicting results. For instance, within the health sector, Farag et al. (2009)found 
evidence of partial fungibility of Development Assistance to Health (DAH) in low-income 
countries, with a $1.00 increase in DAH resulting in a reduction in government public health 
expenditures of $0.27. The authors point out that this is especially detrimental given their 
findings that low-income countries had on average low public health expenditures of $24 per 
capita. By comparison, Lu et al. (2010) found higher levels of partial fungibility whereby every 
$1.00 increase in DAH given to low-income countries resulted in a decrease in public 
expenditure to health of $0.32. However, it may be argued that the variance  in  results may be 
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due to the use of different sample sizes with Farag et al. (2009) using 65 countries whilst used  
Lu et al. (2010) 46 countries. 
 
There appears to be relatively few studies that have aimed to assess the levels of sectoral 
fungibility in the agriculture sector. The few studies that have focused on agriculture, have 
yielded mixed results with a wide spectrum of evidence ranging from agricultural aid being 
fully, partially and non fungible. For example using panel data from 1971 to 1995 a cross-
country study of 18 Sub-Saharan African countries found aid to agriculture fully fungible 
(Devarajan, Rajkumar & Swaroop, 1999). Similarly, looking at a  larger data set of 38 
developing countries, Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu (1998) found  aid to agriculture from 1971 
through 1990 to also be fully fungible. Contrastingly, Gebrehanna (2007) found  in a study of 
9 sub-Saharan Africa countries that aid to agriculture between 1980-2003 agriculture was only 
partially fungible with a $1 increase in aid to agriculture resulting in a decrease in public 
expenditure in the sector by $ 0.29 cents.  
 
The variation of study results makes it difficult to generalise any conclusion on the extent of 
fungibility in the agriculture sector. Perhaps, the variation in results may indicate that 
fungibility is a unique phenomenon which is highly dependent on the country context. This can 
be seen in the mixed results of individual country studies. For example, in an earlier study of 
Indonesia Pack & Pack (1990) found no evidence of fungibility of aid to agriculture whilst in 
their later study of the Domican Republic (Pack & Pack, 1993) the authors found that for every 
33 cents of aid intended for agriculture, agricultural public expenditures  increase by only 1.5 
cents.  
 
The disparity of evidence in aid fungibility studies has also been accompanied with a mix of 
study conclusions as to what factors are more likely to lead to the existence of fungibility.  
 
Within the literature there have been suggestions that the potential for agricultural aid to be 
fungible may be minimised when monitoring of aid is increased. For example, in an earlier 
study Pack & Pack (1998) assert that the amount of aid provided by a donor influenced the level 
of fungibility.  This is to say, Pack & Pack (1998) argue that the larger the contribution of aid 
to a governments total expenditure the more likely donors are able to monitor changes in public 
expenditures therefore incentivise recipient governments to increase their development 
expenditures and reduces aid fungibility.  In qualifying this point, Pack & Pack (1998) 
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compared results of their early studies of the Dominican Republic and Indonesia. Although 
ODA in Dominican Republic accounted for a relatively smaller proportion of public 
expenditure than in Indonesia at 8% versus 19% respectively, Dominican Republic exhibited 
much higher observed levels of fungibility than Indonesia. ODA in Dominican Republic was 
found to be fully fungible with public expenditure being diverted toward non development 
activities of debt and deficit reduction (Pack & Pack, 1993),  whilst in Indonesia, Pack & Pack, 
(1990) found that ODA was not fungible with one dollar of aid resulting in total public spending 
on development activities increasing by $1.58.  
 
As a rebuttal to Pack & Pack’s point, it might be argued that advocating for bulk aid as a means 
of potentially reducing fungibility may produce unwanted ills such as increased aid 
dependency. This is especially the case, where aid recipients mostly receive aid from numerous 
donors. A more practical approach to decreasing fungibility may be to rather advocate for 
coordination amongst donors. Along these lines, Devarajan, Rajkumar & Swaroop (1999) 
found that an inverse relationship existed between the number of donors and the level of 
fungibility. The authors argue that a moral hazard is created as the number of donor rises, where 
recipients would anticipate that a single donor would find it difficult to single out the impact of 
their flows and as such are more likely to treat aid as fungible. In particular, Devarajan, 
Rajkumar & Swaroop (1999) found that in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries  for the 
telecommunications  and education sectors, the number of donors was inversely related to the 
level of fungibility. These results suggest that to minimise the potential for aid fungibility there 
needs to be donor coordination in terms of monitoring and tracking their collective impact of 
aid on public expenditures. 
 
Other studies have put forward that aid modality (i.e. the instruments chosen to deliver foreign 
aid) influences the levels of aid fungibility. Aid is largely disbursed either as project aid, where 
donors design, fund and execute projects, or as budget support, where donors fund beneficiaries 
through national or ministerial public budgets. Some advocates of project aid argued that 
project aid offers a higher economic rate of return as compared to budget support given that aid 
is accompanied with technical support as well it increases the control and visibility donors have 
on disbursed aid (Tarekegn, 2002). However, project aid has been found to undermine the 
effectiveness of aid by crowding out own expenditures(Cordella & Dell’Ariccia, 2007). This is 
to say, in response to a donor funded and executed project a beneficiary government is able to 
divert away their own resources toward other uses given that the needed development 
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investment has been funded as well as executed. For example, Gottret & Schieber (2006) found 
in a cross-country study that a $1.00 increase in project funding in DAH resulted in a $1.65 
decrease in government expenditures in the sector. Donors, in the case of budget support, can 
also impose conditionality on how to allocate the available resources such using concessionary 
loans which having matching requirements. For example, in a cross –country study of 14 
countries (1971-1990)  it was found that a dollar increase in concessionary loans lead to a $1.24 
increase in government expenditure (Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu, 1998).  
 
A running thread in the conclusions of most fungibility studies have mainly aimed to inform 
means of minimising or avoiding fungibility. In fact, there is growing support including 
development agencies toward avoiding disbursing aid to countries that have evidence of 
fungibility(World Bank, 1998).  These sentiments are largely driven by the assumption that 
fungibility is indicative of poor governance or institutional quality such as corruption. Along 
similar lines, , Pack and Pack (1998) further point out that the differences in levels of fungibility 
between the Dominican Republic and Indonesia was also a function of the differences in fiscal 
policies. The Dominican Republic run consistently run high fiscal deficits which encouraged 
aid to be treated as fungible. In contrast, Indonesia had no aid fungibility which the authors 
argue is due to the government employing conservative fiscal policies despite having large oil 
reserve revenues and high inflows of aid.  
 
Although these recommendations bear some compelling arguments, there have been dissenters 
that have argued that the concept of fungibility should not be the most central concern in 
shaping donor policies on improving the effectiveness of aid. 
 
Pettersson (2007) discourages against the use of fungibility as a means of selecting which 
countries should receive aid, as he argues that such policies need to be based on conclusive 
evidence that fungible aid funds are indeed less productive than non-fungible funds. To this 
end, Pettersson (2007) tested his assertion for aid in 60 countries and found that there were no 
significant statistical differences in productivity of fungible and non-fungible funds. These 
results may suggest that aid recipients may be as well informed as donors as to where additional 
resources of revenue are needed and more productive. Additionally, Pettersson (2007) found 
that governments with good institutional quality and responsible fiscal policies also had 
evidence of fungibility.  Therefore using poor governance as an indicator of fungibility may 
 
18 
Ritta Shine _SHNRIT001 
prematurely lead to recipient countries that are need of aid not receiving aid on account of 
perceived poor governance.  
 
Fungibility may potentially not be a ‘bad’ outcome and may actually indicate other underlying 
dynamics. For example, fungibility may rather signal a divergence of donor and aid recipient 
government priorities. To illustrate this concept, one can look at the case of Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia,  which despite having similar shares to aid going to health and education have 
significant differences in the level of aid fungibility in these sectors. More specifically, in 
response to receiving 5.9 cents of aid to the education and health sectors from each dollar of 
total aid, Sri Lanka reduced public expenditures toward these sectors by 1.9 cents whilst 
Indonesia experienced an increase of 18.9 cents of public expenditure to health and education 
for every 7.2 cents of aid received in these sectors(World Bank, 1998). 
 
Along similar lines, there is growing consensus within the literature that fungibility in itself is 
too narrowly focused on the composition of expenditures and making sure that aid is used in 
accordance to donor wishes. Fiscal response studies argue that aid has much wider economic 
effects in that it may influence recipient government’s incentives to increase domestic revenues 
mobilisation. (Mcgillivray & Morrissey, 2000, 2001) argues that fungibility studies mostly 
ignore these effects, which may be more insightful in understand how aid may impact not only 
spending behaviours of recipient government but also their assertion to increasing revenues. 
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2.3.3 Fiscal Response of Aid  
2.3.4 The Theory of Fiscal Response of Aid 
 
The first fiscal response study was carried out by Heller (1975a) and subsequently adopted by 
other authors ( (Mosley, Hudson & Horrell, 1987; Gang & Khan, 1991; Franco-Rodriguez, 
Morrissey & McGillivray, 1998; Gupta et al., 2003; Clist & Morrissey, 2011; Mavrotas, 2014). 
These studies much like aid fungibility studies focus on the utility maximising principle albeit 
using different functions. Fiscal response studies postulate that aid recipient governments 
maximise their utility when they achieve predetermined revenue and expenditure targets against 
a given budget constraint. Public expenditure as referred to in fiscal response studies consists 
of government consumption and public sector investment, whilst government revenue which 
constitutes as a budget constraint derived from tax and borrowings. Therefore assuming that 
the public sector acts as a utility maximising agent, it fashions its utility function in accordance 
to: 
 
Equation 1:     U= U ( Ig, G, T, B) where,   
 
U = Utility 
 Ig =Public Investment 
 G = Government Consumption 
 T = Tax 
 B = Borrowings 
 
The utility maximisation equation is presented in more detailed in a quadratic function: 
 
Equation 2:   U= α0− α1( Ig – I*g)
2 – α2( G – G*g)
2 – α3( T – T*g)
2 –  α4( B – B*g)
2 
                           2                   2                    2                     2 
 
The variables with asterix I*,T*,B*,G* represent the exogenous targets levels of the 
endogenous revenue and expenditure variables of I,G,T,B. Equation 2 above more clearly 
illustrates the point that government will maximise its utility when it achieves all expenditure 
and revenue targets. However government is subject to a budget constraint when attempting to 
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The standard fiscal response model treats aid as exogenous and sees aid as an external source 
of revenue that influences the budget constraint. Additionally, aid is seen as additional revenue 
to be used for public investment as opposed to consumption expenditures. Hellen (1975) 
quantifies this constraint in the following equations: 
 
Equation 3:    G + Ig = T+A+B where  
 
Ig =Public Investment 
 G = Government Consumption 
 T = Tax 
 B = Borrowings 
 A = Aid (includes grants and loans) 
 
In attempting to maximise their utility, recipient governments can respond to an exogenous 
inflow of aid through four main channels. Firstly, holding expenditure and borrowings constant, 
in meeting its budget constraint recipient government can reduce its tax effort after receiving 
aid, in so doing allowing aid to subsidise previously tax financed revenues. In this same vain, 
Gupta et al., (2003) point out an extreme case where, governments can decide to entirely reduce 
its tax effort by the amount of aid received. Secondly, holding tax and government expenditure 
constant, in response to an inflow of aid governments can reduce their domestic borrowings 
therefore allowing aid to finance a portion of revenue usually derived from domestic 
borrowings. Thirdly, holding tax and borrowings constant in response to an inflow of aid, 
recipient government can increase their government expenditure by the amount of aid received. 
However, the extent to which government expenditure can increase may be enhanced by 
governments altering their attitudes toward raising revenue from tax and domestic borrowings. 
For example, if borrowings are held constant, government expenditure may increase by less 
that than the increase in aid if governments also reduce their tax efforts. Likewise, government 
expenditure may increase by more that than the increase in aid if governments increase their 
tax efforts.  
2.3.5 Empirical Findings on the Fiscal Response to Aid  
 
In Heller's (1975) seminal work on fiscal response, the impact of  aid  on various fiscal 
aggregates such as tax, borrowings, socio-economic consumption, civil consumption and  
developmental public expenditure in eleven African countries was examined. The study 
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revealed that increase in aid resulted in a less than proportionate increase in total expenditure 
(toward investment rather than consumption) as aid also led to a reduction in domestic taxes 
and borrowing. Heller (1975), further points out that the extent of the impact of aid on public 
fiscal behaviour largely dependent on the modality of aid. This is to say, Heller (1975) found 
that aid disbursed as grants led to higher increases in government consumption by reducing tax 
whilst loans led to higher increases in public investment expenditures. The difference in 
payment terms of grant versus loan aid may explain the difference in observed levels of fiscal 
response. This is to say, recipient governments are incentivised to decrease tax or borrowings 
when they receive grant aid as they do not need to pay back grants. In contrast, given that aid 
disbursed as a loan needs to be repaid the recipient government is incentivised to increase their 
tax and borrowing burden in order to service the loan. Subsequent studies using Heller's (1975) 
model have also found similar results regarding the influence of aid modality on fiscal response. 
For example, in a study of five South and South East Asian countries, Khan & Hoshino (1992) 
found that 85cents of a dollar of aid disbursed as a loan was used for public investment whilst 
only 32cents of every dollar of  grant aid was used for investment purposes. Additionally, the 
authors found that grant aid led to a decrease in tax whilst loans resulted in an increase in tax.  
The authors argue that the burden of loan payments on recipient governments induce 
governments to not only increase tax but also  spend the aid inflow on investment expenditures 
that will yield them a return on investment which can additionally contribute toward servicing 
the loan (Khan & Hoshino, 1992).  
 
More recent studies have placed less weight on cross –country studies and have largely opted 
to focus on  individual country studies as the fiscal response of government is more likely 
unique to a given country. This is evident in the array of largely divergent results from the 
country case studies. 
 
Franco-Rodriguez, Morrissey & McGillivray, (1998) find that donors should increasingly be 
concerned with the fiscal response of aid in Pakistan. The authors find that whilst an additional 
rupee of committed aid resulted in a .05 rupee increase in investment expenditure, total 
expenditures decreased by 2.31 rupees. With regards to domestic revenue, 1 rupee change in 
aid in Pakistan resulted in a decrease of tax by 3.59 rupees and an increase in borrowings of 
0.88 rupee, which further suggests that inflow of aid in the country negatively impacts public 
sector saving (Franco-Rodriguez, Morrissey & McGillivray, 1998). Similar to the Pakistan, 
Mcgillivray & Ahmed (1999) found that in response to one Peso of multilateral aid tax 
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decreased by .98 Pesos whilst an increase in one Peso of bilateral aid led to a.98 Pesos decrease 
in tax. In contrast, aid has been found to cause an increase in tax and reduction in borrowings 
in Costa Rica whilst in India aid had no impact on tax or borrowings (Franco-Rodriguez, 2000; 
Swaroop, Jha & Sunil, 2000).  
 
Unlike fungibility studies there has been relatively fewer studies focusing on the fiscal response 
of recipient governments to inflows of aid. To the best of our knowledge,  fiscal response 
studies that do exists have largely focused on the impact of aid at the macro level with no studies 
having investigate the fiscal effects of sectoral aid on sectoral fiscal aggregates. This is largely 
due to the availability of data as well as the fact that in developing countries fiscal revenue 
aggregates such as tax, borrowings are largely done at the national level (Mcgillivray & 
Morrissey, 2001).  
 
However, the results of fiscal response studies albeit at the macro level can reveal downstream 
fiscal effects at the sectoral level. This is especially the case for the agriculture sector, which is 
largely reliant on receiving not only external development assistance but tax from other sectors. 
This is because the low monetization of the agriculture sector in developing countries adversely 
affects its ability to raise the needed revenue to sustain its funding needs. This is largely due to 
the high proportion of smallholder subsistence farmers which fall well below taxable income 
thresholds (Aguirre, Griffith & Yucelik, 1981) As such, the indications in the fiscal response 
that aid may have a negative impact on tax revenue effort may therefore reduce potentially the 
amount of public revenues that can flow to the agriculture sector .  
 
Similarly, findings that aid may lead to increased national borrowings and therefore increased 
fiscal deficits have important implication for the agriculture sector (Mcgillivray & Morrissey, 
2001).Fiscal deficits for example are argued to exert upward pressure on interest rates(Aisen & 
Hauner, 2008). This occurs when in a bid to finance the budget deficit through increased 
borrowings, government incentivises the private sector to purchase government bonds 
government by increasing real interest rates. Schaub & Sumner (1993) argue that interest rates 
can impact agriculture through three main channels, namely debt, investment and land value. 
A rise in interest rates may result in a reduced access to finance for small holder farmers as high 
interest rates would increase borrowing costs to levels that smallholder farmers cannot afford. 
Interest rates also may also lower the value of land, given that farm land value is found by 
discounting expected farm earnings with prevailing interest rates. Finally, increasing interest 
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rates negatively impact agricultural investment. This is because, in the case that interest rates 
is higher than the rate of return would disincentives individuals from making agricultural 
investments and further crowd out public investment. 
 
Within the fiscal response as well as fungibility study there appears to be little consensus on 
the impact of aid on public expenditures. Firstly, fungibility study results range from indicating 
that aid has no impact on aid to situations in which aid may actually cause a more than 
proportionate increase in public expenditures. There has also been a divergence in ideas to 
explain why in some case aid leads to higher public expenditures whilst in others leads to a 
decrease in public expenditures.  This has also been the case in fiscal response studies with 
which the impact of aid on fiscal aggregates range from aid increasing domestic resource 
mobilisation to cases in which it displaces it. Perhaps a more pertinent observation is despite 
the significance of agriculture in developing countries there has been little attention paid by 
these studies in understanding the impact of aid both at the sectoral and national level on public 
expenditures in the agriculture sector. In particular, we identified two gaps in the aid fungibility 
and fiscal response literature that we believe could inform this neglected research area. First, in 
his cross country study (fifty seven countries) of the influence of governance on fungibility 
Pettersson (2007) did not analyse the fungibility of aid to agriculture in isolation but rather  
aggregated agricultural aid with other sectors including energy, and transportation. Second, 
within fiscal response studies no study had specifically analysed the fiscal effects of aid on a 
subset of aid dependent developing countries in which agriculture is a significant portion of the 
economy. In the next section we aim to provide the results as well as the discussion of our 
empirical analysis which aimed to investigate the fiscal effects of aid in the agricultural sector.    
 
24 
Ritta Shine _SHNRIT001 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter aims to present the research methodology and strategy used in the empirical 
analysis of the study. To this end, an overview of the study area, research design, sample 
selection, data collection, and data analysis methods employed in the study are described. In 
addition, study limitations and the techniques employed to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the study are discussed.  
 
3.1 Research Approach and Strategy 
3.1.1 Scope of study  
 
Using both descriptive and empirical analysis, the study explored factors that might adversely 
affect the amount of public spending committed to agriculture. The level of public spending is 
likely influenced by both aid received as well as sources of government revenue such as taxes 
that can be distributed to the sector. Thus, the study aimed to investigate the impact of ODA 
inflows on public expenditure and tax revenue in a sample of sixty-six low- and middle-income 
countries. 
 
First, a fungibility study was undertaken to investigate the direct impact of aid to agriculture on 
public expenditure in the sector. In addition, we investigated if quality of governance influenced 
the level of aid fungibility. The following primary research questions were explored: 
  
i. To what extent is aid to the agricultural sector fungible in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs)? 
ii. Are LMICs with poor governance more likely to have fungible aid in the 
agriculture sector? 
Secondly, a fiscal response study was conducted to ascertain the impact of specific types of aid 
(i.e. grant and loans) on domestic resource mobilisation, by answering the following research 
question:  
 
iii. Does aid committed in the form of loans lead to higher tax raising efforts aid 
committed as grants? 
Results of the fiscal response study aimed to inform which aid flow type maximised domestic 
resource mobilisation in low- and middle-income countries. 
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3.2 Data Collection, Frequency and Choice of Data 
Data used in the study was exclusively secondary data collected from online data repositories. 
To ensure consistency and comparability across currency data, where applicable currency data 
expressed in current US $ was converted into constant 2005 USD prices. To do this, the 2005 
US Consumer Price Index (CPI) collected from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
(www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm) was used to deflate/inflate data expressed in dollars in various 
years to constant 2005 levels. 
 
3.2.1 Fungibility Study Data 
For the fungibility study the following time series data was collected for a sample of ODA 
recipient countries:  
 
i. Population data was gathered from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 
repository and was used to calculate per capita values for all variables in the model. 
Population statistics in the World Bank data set contains the annual mid-year estimate 
of country population excluding refugees with no permanent asylum status (The World 
Bank, 2014). 
ii. Public agricultural expenditure data was collected from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute‘s (IFPRI) public expenditure database, Statistics of Public 
Expenditure for Economic Development (SPEED). SPEED data comprises primarily 
of data from the IMF Government Financial Statistics Yearbook (GFS) and is 
supplemented by in-country information gathered from various national sources such 
as national bureaus of statistics, ministries of finance, general accountant offices and 
central banks (SPEED, 2013). SPEED data aggregates and reports agricultural public 
expenditure data based on the IMF’s COFOG as indicated in Appendix A. 
iii. Official aid to agriculture data was collected from the AidData database 
(www.aiddata.org) which tracks all aid OECD and non-OECD commitment and 
disbursements amounts (AidData, 2014). In line with the DAC definition of aid to 
agriculture, AidData considers aid to agriculture to include all aid commitments 
targeting agriculture, fishing, and forestry, as indicated in Appendix B.  
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iv. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data was collected from the WDI database. World 
Bank methodology derives GDP data by summating gross value added by all producers 
in the economy net of product taxes not included in the products value.  
v. Food Aid data was collected from the AidData database and in line with DAC 
definitions accounts for all aid flows committed to providing emergency food aid to 
high risk populations affected by adverse climatic or conflict conditions. 
vi. Governance index data was collected from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) database. The governance index reflects the perception of a mix of 
enterprises, citizen and experts from developed and developing countries on the quality 
of public services, policy formation and implementation in a given country. The index 
ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). 
 
3.2.2 Fiscal Response Study Data 
For the fiscal response study the following time series data was collected for a sample of ODA 
recipient countries:  
 
i. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data was collected from the WDI database. World 
Bank methodology derives GDP data as described above in section 1.2.1.  
ii. Tax Revenue as a percent of GDP was collected from the WDI database and comprises 
all compulsory, non-repayable receipts to the central government for public purposes as 
a percentage of current GDP.  
iii. GDP per Capita was collected from the WDI database and comprises of GDP figures 
expressed as a ratio of midyear population estimates.   
iv. Agricultural Value Added as per cent of GDP was collected from the WDI database 
and corresponds to the net output of activities related to agriculture (crop and livestock 
production), fishing and forestry expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
v. Industrial Value Added as per cent of GDP data was collected from the WDI database 
and comprises the net output of activities related to mining, manufacturing, 
construction, electricity, water and gas expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
vi. Imports of Goods and Services as per cent of GDP data was collected from the WDI 
database and includes the value of goods and service purchased from international trade 
markets expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
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vii. Exports of Goods and Services as per cent of GDP data was collected from the WDI 
database and includes the value of goods and service produced in a country and sold to 
the international trade markets expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
viii. ODA Grants as a percentage of GDP data was collected from the Aiddata database and 
comprises all ODA transfers made available to a recipient which carries a repayment 
obligation. To calculate total annual ODA grant flows as percentage of GDP for each 
recipient country, all ODA grant flows corresponding to a particular year were 
summated and divided by the annual GDP 
ix. Net ODA Loans as a percentage of GDP data was obtained from  the Aiddata database 
and includes all ODA flows extended to recipient governments of which a portion is 
required to be repaid (using soft interest rates such as 0%) and where at a minimum 
25% of the total commitment amount may be in the form of a grant. To calculate total 
annual net loan flows as percentage of GDP for each recipient country, all ODA loan 




Due to the availability of data, both the fiscal response and fungibility study were conducted 
over a 15 year study period, from 1996 to 2010.  
 
To undertake the fiscal response and fungibility studies a sample of DAC recipient countries 
was selected from the full population set of all DAC aid recipients using purposive sampling 
techniques. This is to say, randomisation was not used in the sampling process and countries 
included met certain criterion which enabled us to answer study research questions (Kumar, 
2014). The study focused on low-and middle-income countries in which agriculture was an 
important component of the economy and data was available for public expenditure and aid to 
agriculture. 
 
The sampling procedure used is illustrated in Figure 3. As a first step, we collected time series 
data for DAC recipient countries including agricultural output (available in the WDI dataset), 
public expenditure (available in the SPEED dataset), and ODA received (available in the 
AidData dataset). These four preliminary datasets were then merged and countries in common 
were retained (n=99). High-income countries were then excluded, leaving 95 low- and middle-
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income countries. Of the 95 low- and middle-income countries, 13 were then excluded as they 
were missing agricultural output as a percentage of GDP in 2010. The remaining 86 countries 
were ranked according to agricultural output as a percentage of GDP and those ranked in the 
lowest decile (corresponding to 7% of GDP or less) were excluded. Finally, of the remaining 
69 countries, 3 countries were removed due to unavailability of public agricultural expenditure 
data. Thus, the final sample set included 66 low- and middle-income countries as listed in 
Appendix C. 
 
Figure 3: Sample Selection Procedure 
 
DAC recipient countries,  
N=148 
Countries in the WDI database 
with agriculture output as 
percentage of GDP, N=214 
Countries with agricultural 
expenditure (SPEED) data 
N=147 
Recipient countries/regions in 
the AidData 2.1 (1996) 
dataset, N=233 
Merge all datasets and keep 
countries in common, N=99 
Restrict dataset to ODA loans 
and grants given since 1996 
for agriculture, fisheries or 
forestry, N=99 
  
Restrict dataset to LMICs only  
N=95 
Restrict dataset to countries 
with % of agriculture in total 
gdp available in 2010 
N=86 
Rank countries by % of 
agriculture output total GDP 
in 2010. Exclude those in the 
lowest decile, N=69 
Restrict dataset to countries 
with public agricultural 
expenditure  
data available, N=66 
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3.4 Data Analysis Methods 
To evaluate the impact of aid on public expenditure to agriculture and tax revenues, we used 
panel regression analysis, which pools both cross-sectional and time series data. Covariates for 
individual countries were collected at points in time (cross-sections) and repeatedly across time 
periods from 1996-2010 (time series).  
3.4.1 Model Specification for Fungibility Test 
 
The methodology of  Pack & Pack (1990) in their study of sectorial fungibility in Indonesia 
was used as a basis for our fungibility empirical model. This method has been employed in 
numerous fungibility studies, including those which focused on the Dominican Republic (Pack 
& Pack, 1993), Nepal (Bhattarai, 2007), and cross-country studies (Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu, 
1998; Pettersson, 2007).  
 
In their study of Indonesia, Pack and Pack (1990) estimated a series of linear expenditure 
equations subject to the following government constraint:  
 
CE t + D t = R t + AID t 
where,  
CEt  = per capita non-development expenditures 
Dt = per capita government development expenditure per category 
Rt  = per capita total revenue net of aid in time 
AIDt  = total aid received per capita  
 
The series of linear expenditure equations that were estimated are as follows: 
 
Di,t =  g (GDPt, AIDi,t, OAID i,t, TIME), 
 
CEt = f (GDPt, AIDt) 
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Di,t quantifies per capita government development expenditure per category i, in year t, and is 
a function aid per capita for expenditure category i (AIDi,t), all other aid flows to non i categories 
(OAIDi,t,), and a time variable indicating the year (TIME). Pack and Pack (1990) therefore 
tested for fungibility by estimating the extent to which aid for a specific sector is diverted 
toward use in another sector. CEt are the per capita non development expenditures not supported 
by aid in year t and is a function of per capita GDP at time t (GDPt) and total sectoral aid per 
capita at time t. Rt is per capita total revenue net of aid at time t and is a function of revenues 
from taxation on oil and non-oil (e.g. gas) resources.  
 
For the purposes of our study we deviated slightly from the Pack and Pack methodology and 
did not estimate the effect of aid to agriculture on each part of the government equation but 
rather only on public expenditures to agriculture. In addition, in terms of estimating fungibility, 
unlike Pack and Pack (1990) we did not attempt to identify where aid to agriculture is diverted 
(i.e. to which other sectors), largely due to the availability of data. By modifying Pack and 
Pack’s (1990) first equation (Di,t) we estimated the following equation: 
 
AGEt  = β0AG + β1AGGDPt + β2AG AAG t + β3AGEMGt + β4AGTIMEt + Ɛ AG 
where,  
AGEt  = per capita public expenditure to agriculture  
GDPt = per capita GDP 
AAGt  = per capita aid to agriculture 
EMGt  = Emergency food aid 
 
In the above equation, we aim to model the effect of aid to agriculture (AAGt) on public 
expenditures to agriculture, (AGEt) whilst controlling for economic growth using GDP per 
capita as a proxy. Following from Pettersson (2007)  we integrated the potential shocks in the 
economy that may influence public expenditures by also including a dummy variable, EMGt to 
account for whether a country was the recipient of emergency aid. 
 
The beta point estimates (β) estimate the impact of a unit increases in model variables on public 
expenditures. The extent of fungibility would therefore be observed by the magnitude and 
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i. Full Fungibility = β2AG < -1, where 1 unit increase in aid leads to a decrease in 
expenditure of the same or greater magnitude suggesting all aid to agriculture is diverted 
to other uses. 
 
ii. Partial Fungibility =  -1 < β2AG < 1, where a 1 unit increase in aid leads to a less than 
proportionate increase in public expenditures therefore a portion of aid is diverted to 
non-agriculture uses. 
 
iii. No Fungibility = β2AG  > 1, where a 1 unit increase in aid lead to an equal or larger 
increase in public expenditures therefore all aid to agriculture is used in the sector. 
In addition to the main fungibility analyses, a sub-analysis was conducted in which the World 
Bank governance index was included as a model variable, G (see equation below). This was 
used to answer the second research question and ascertain if institutional quality influenced 
levels of fungibility of aid to agriculture. 
 
AGEt  = β0AG + β1AGGDPt + β2AG AAG t + β3AGG+ β4AGEMGt + β5AGTIMEt + Ɛ AG 
3.4.2 Model Specification for Fiscal Response Study 
 
This study employed the regression model used by Gupta et al. (2003) to analyse the effect of 
aid on tax revenue in the study sample of countries. This methodology was chosen as Gupta et 
al. (2003) were the first to examine the effect of aid composition (loan verse grants) on tax 
revenue in a large cross-country study (using a sample of 107 countries). The model has also 
been used in other cross-country studies studying similar subject matter (Clist & Morrissey, 
2011) and as such allow study results to be more consistently compared to other study results. 
The study used the following equation to model the impact of aid on recipient tax effort by 
regressing tax revenue against aid disbursed (distinguishing between loans and grants) whilst 
accounting for variables that would proxy for the tax base structure: 
 
T/ GDP = β0 + β1AGR + β2 IND + β3INCOME+ β4GRANT + β5LOAN + β6M + β7X + Ɛ 
where,  
T/GDP  = Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
AGR  = Agriculture output as a percentage of GDP 
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IND  = Industry output as a percentage of GDP 
TRADE = Trade taxes (form imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP  
INCOME = GDP per capita 
GRANT = Total aid grant as a percentage of GDP 
LOAN  = Total loan grant as a percentage of GDP 
 
T/ GDP is regressed against total aid disaggregated by composition to see the influence of aid 
disbursed as a loan (LOAN) and as a grant (GRANT) on tax. A positive beta coefficient (β4 > 
0 ; β5 >0) for GRANT and LOAN variables indicate a positive impact of aid on tax, whist 
negative coefficients (β4 < 0 ; β5 < 0) indicate the opposite effect. To account for the economic 
structure of countries within the sample, agricultural (AGR) and industrial (IND) value added 
as a percentage of GDP were included to indicate the taxable capacity of the recipient country. 
For instance, a large agriculture sector in developing countries means that the tax base is 
relatively small (β1 < 0) given that the sector mainly consists of subsistence farmers who fall 
outside taxable income brackets (Emran & Stiglitz, 2005). In contrast a large industrial sector 
would indicate the tax base of the country is relatively high (β1 > 0) given that the industrial 
sector is normally commercial in nature and as such is taxable (Clist & Morrissey, 2011). The 
model also included trade variables in order to account for the fact that trade tax revenues 
comprise a large share of tax revenue in developing countries (Greenaway & Milner, 1991; 
Ghura, 1998). Following from Clist & Morrissey, (2011) we slightly modified Gupta et al. 
(2003) model by disaggregating the trade variables into two variables, namely imports (M) and 
exports (X) to account for the fact that imports and exports are often charged at different rates 
which means their impact on tax revenue may be different. To account for the level of economic 
development which may influence the amount of taxable individuals and therefore the amount 







3.5 Research Reliability and Validity 
3.5.1 Research Validity 
Research validity is concerned with ensuring that research instruments of choice have measured 
what they intended to measure (Drost, 2004). Quantitative statistical analysis should strive to 
 
33 
Ritta Shine _SHNRIT001 
ensure both internal and external validity. Internal validity is concerned with ensuring the 
research design is appropriate in testing the hypothesis that aim to answer the research questions 
for the sample being studied. External validity concerns whether or not research findings and 
conclusions pertaining to a particular sample can be generalized to a whole population. 
 
3.5.1.1 Internal Validity 
To ensure the internal validity of this study we first tested that the data used met the assumptions 
of panel regression analysis. As asserted by Antonakis & Dietz (2011), disregarding regression 
assumptions can lead to Type I (mistakenly accepting the null hypothesis) or Type II 
(mistakenly rejecting the null hypothesis) errors or over- or under-estimation of the significance 
of point estimates of the effects of independent variables on dependent variables. In this regard, 
we conducted various statistical diagnostic tests in order to identify if there were any violations 
of panel regression analysis so as to inform which panel regression modelling technique would 
be appropriate given the underlying data. The results of the statistical diagnostic tests, including 
remedial actions for observed violations are presented in section 4.1.1 and 4.4.2. 
 
The following statistical diagnostics tests were conducted prior to conducting both fungibility 
and fiscal response studies: 
 
i. Test for Autocorrelation (serial correlation): Panel regression assumes that past error 
terms are not correlated to error terms in successive future years. Using the Durbin 
Watson (DW) test we tested for first-order serial correlation errors, where past error 
residuals are tested for serial correlation with only the proceeding time period. The DW 
test tests the null hypothesis that errors are not correlated against the alternative 
hypothesis that error terms are correlated. The DW statistic falls within a 0-4 range. A 
DW statistic closer to zero indicates positive serial correlation whereby positive error 
terms are likely to lead to other error terms being positive. A DW statistic closer to two 
indicates no serial correlation (null hypothesis for no auto-correlation cannot be 
rejected), while a DW statistic closer to four indicates negative serial correlation 
whereby positive error terms are likely to lead to other error terms being negative. 
 
ii. Tests on Nonlinearity: Panel regression analysis assumes that dependent and 
independent variables are linearly related. In the case that the assumption of linearity is 
violated the model would result in biased parameter estimates. Graphical techniques 
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were used to observe the linearity between independent and dependent variables. More 
specifically, partial regression plots of dependent against independent variable 
observations were created. If observations followed a linear trend (straight line) then 
the assumption of linearity would not be violated and if observations did not follow a 
linear rend (e.g. curved trend) then nonlinearity is present.   
 
iii. Test for Heteroskedasticity: Panel regression assumes homogeneity in the variance of 
regression residual terms. A violation of this assumption would mean that residuals are 
heteroskedastic in that the variance between residuals is non-constant. The study 
employed both graphical and statistical test to ascertain if heteroskedasticity existed the 
study model. Firstly, the pattern of residuals and fitted (predicted) values was plotted. 
If the scatter plot showed a random pattern of data points then the model would be valid 
as residual variance would be homogenous whilst if a clear pattern emerged then the 
residual variance would be heteroskedastic and model validity would be violated. In 
addition we conducted the Lagrange Multiplier test proposed by Engel (1982) to 
formally test for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects in 
which error terms have time varying volatility. 
 
iv. Test for Stationary: Panel regression assumes that the underlying time series data is 
stationary in that it is predictable and can be modelled or forecasted or alternatively does 
not have a unit root problem. In the case that non-stationary data is used, biased 
estimators will be produced which may indicate a relationship between dependent and 
regressor variables that may not exist. The Augmented Dikey-Fuller test was employed 
to test the null hypothesis that variables contain a unit root against the alternative 
hypothesis that the variables are stationary. The t-test statistic produced is compared to 
the critical values and value at 5% significance level. 
 
3.5.1.2 External Validity 
External validity was ensured through the sampling methodology. This is to say, we ensured 
that the sample size was large enough to infer results onto to a larger population. In particular, 
we made sure that the sample size had variance with respect to geographic as well as income 
level, in order to account for the disparity across low-and middle-income groups (see section 
4.1 for sample description).   
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3.6 Study Limitations 
Given that the data collected is exclusively secondary, it leaves the quality of data at the mercy 
of various agents involved in the capturing and recording of primary data which may affect the 
consistency and reliability data. For example, much of the data used is produced by national 
statistical systems (NSS) in developing countries. NSS  are notoriously under-funded and 
therefore do not have the required capacity to efficiently and effectively produce good quality 
statistics that are reliable, accurate, accessible and timely (Fonton & Hounkonnou, 2014). 
Country time series data was also often missing, which limited the number of countries that 
could be include in the sample. In addition, given that the study used various data repositories 
that collated both NSS and donor data, each using varying data collection and recording 
methodologies this may affect comparability and consistency of data across study participants. 
 
Inconsistencies in the data may stem from differences in the interpretation of how particular 
data should be classified. For example, how governments classify agricultural activities may be 
inconsistent, as use of the IMF’s COFOG is not mandatory (Fan, Omilola & Lambert, 2009). 
Additionally, donor agencies have different interpretations of what constitutes agriculture and 
what constitutes food aid which are reported using different accounting systems (ODI, 2012). 
Islam (2011) points out two main shortcomings regarding DAC’s data on aid to agriculture. 
Firstly, in the OCED/DAC database aid to agriculture consists of the summation of all aid to 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, classified under the category AFF (Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries), however it is only from 1994 that the data has been disaggregated to allow for 
analysis of the different sub-sectoral components of AFF. Secondly, the OECD/DAC database 
has categories which amalgamate some aid flows to agriculture with other aid flows making it 
difficult to distinguish if there exists any additional flows to agriculture. For example, aid 
disbursed for multiple sectors is categorized under the dominant component of aid, meaning 
that if 60% of disbursed aid is for financial services and the remainder to agriculture, the aid 
flow will be classified under the financial services category.  Similarily, aid intended for 
multiple sectors where no one sector dominates is categorized as “multi-sectoral aid”. In the 
same token, if aid is unable to be classified in accordance with any of the CSR purpose codes 
it is classified as “un-allocable aid”. Additionally, ODI (2012) acknowledges that the use of 
different reporting systems and interpretations of agricultural aid by donors may lead to the loss 
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Thus, conventional measures of aid to agriculture may ignore important sources of assistance 
to agriculture and therefore underestimate the magnitude of these external aid flows (ODI, 
2012). For example, DAC’s definition of aid to agriculture excludes a significant portion of aid 
from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), a United Nations agency 
focusing on the development of agriculture and the rural poor. Between 2003 and 2009 DAC 
excluded 46% of IFAD funding from its recorded flows of agricultural aid, because this funding 
was used for developing value chain financing as it did not fall under the DAC definition of aid 
to agriculture. Additionally, DAC excluded IFAD’s funding of financial services despite the 
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4 RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter divides our research findings into three main sections. The first section provides a 
description of the sample with the aim of showing the region distribution and income level of 
countries included. The second section provides a summary of the results from our descriptive 
and empirical analysis. The third section then provides an analysis and discussion of these 
results.  
 
4.1 Sample Description 
The final sample included sixty-six countries selected using the methodology presented in 
section three and shown in Figure 4 (the complete list is shown in Appendix C).  
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As indicated in Table 1 below, the data used in the study included developing countries spread 
over six regions, including the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region, East and Central Asia 
(ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The majority of countries in the sample are located 
in the sub-Saharan region (42%), followed by EAP (15%), LAC (14%), South Asia (11%), 
ECA (11%) and MENA (8%).  
 
Table 1: Regional Distribution of Study Sample (Frequency) 
Region Frequency Percentage 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  10 15% 
East and Central Asia (ECA) 7 11% 
Latin and Caribbean (LAC) 9 14% 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 5 8% 
South Asia  7 11% 
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) 28 42% 
Total 66 100% 
 
The sample of countries in the study also had a good variance with regards to income levels, as 
shown in Figure 5. This is important as aid and public expenditure may differ according to 
income levels of countries and this may impact on levels of observed fungibility.  
 
 
Figure 5: Income Distribution of Study Sample 
 
Income Group 
Upper-middle income  
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As shown in Table 2, lower-middle-income countries accounted for the majority of the sample 
(41%) with the remainder equally shared by low- and high-income countries. 
 
Table 2: Income Distribution of Study Sample (Frequency) 
Income Group Frequency Percentage 
Low-income   20 30% 
Lower-Middle-income  27 41% 
Upper -Middle-income  19 29% 
Total 66 100% 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis Results 
4.2.1 Agricultural Output  
Table 3 presents the average agricultural and industrial output for low, lower-middle, and 
upper-middle-income countries for 1996-2010. Low-income countries had the highest share of 
agriculture in GDP accounting for 38.2% of GDP followed by lower-middle and upper-middle-
income countries with 20.5% and 12.0% respectively.   
 
Table 3: Average Sector output as a Percentage of GDP 1996-2010 
Country income level Agriculture (%) Industry (%) 
Low-income   38.2 18.9 
Lower-Middle-income  20.5 29.8 
Upper -Middle-income  12.0 34.2 
 
Despite the large contribution of agriculture to GDP in low-income countries, we found that 
over time the share declined considerably between 1996 and 2010. As illustrated in Figure 6, 
in low-income countries agricultural output declined from 44% of GDP in 1996 to 34% in 2010. 
Similarly, agricultural output as a share of GDP in lower-middle and upper-middle countries 
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Figure 6: Agricultural verses Industrial Output (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
By contrast, industrial output as a share of GDP has increased or remained constant over this 
time period. As indicated in Table 3, upper-middle-income countries had the largest share 
industrial output which on average accounted for 34% of GDP, followed by lower-middle-
income countries and low-income countries in which industrial output accounted for 19% and 
30% of national income respectively. Growth in the industrial sector as a share of GDP was 
higher in upper-middle-income countries (3%) relative to low-income countries where 
industrial output remained largely stagnant. 
 
4.3 Composition and Trends for Government Expenditure and Revenues 
4.3.1 Total Government Expenditure 
During the period 1996-2010, in absolute terms total government expenditure across low- and 
middle-income countries increased by approximately 2.1 times to $ US 1.7 trillion in 2010 
(Figure 7). However, the increase in public expenditure was largely driven by increases in 
public expenditure from the EAP region, with public expenditures in this region accounting for 
37% of all public expenditures in developing countries in 1996 and increasing to 65% in 2010. 
The ECA region experienced a slight increase in public expenditure, increasing its 1% share of 
total public expenditure in developing countries in 1996 to 3% in 2010. In contrast, other 
regions have decreased their share of total public expenditure, including MENA, SSA, LAC, 
and South Asia regions, each decreasing their contribution to total developing country public 
expenditure by 51%, 48%, 34%, and 26% respectively. 
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Figure 7: Trend in Total Government Expenditures (1996-2010) 
 
As illustrated Table 4, during 1996-2000 total government expenditures across developing 
countries was spent on recurrent expense items. However, from 1996 to 2010 the share of 
capital expenditures as a fraction of total government expenditures increased by 3% from 1996 
levels to account for an average of 49.9% of total government expenditure between 2008 and 
2010. 
 
Table 4: Composition of Government Expenditure (capital verse recurrent) 
Year 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 
Recurrent Expenditure 53.9% 54.6% 52.5% 51.0% 50.1% 
Capital Expenditure 46.1% 45.4% 47.5% 49.0% 49.9% 
Total Government Expenditure 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
4.3.2 Public Expenditure to Agriculture 
As indicated in Figure 8 the study found that for developing countries total public expenditures 
to agriculture during the period 1996 to 2010 amounted to $ US 835.5 billion. Although in 
absolute terms public expenditures in the agriculture sector nearly tripled from 1996 to 2010 
the annual change in expenditures appears to have been erratic over time. For instance, there 
was a slight annual decrease of public expenditures to agriculture from 1996 to 1997 of 0.5% 
to $US 27.1 billion. Going forward from 1997 to 2006, year on year changes in real 
expenditures in agriculture increased substantially, with 2006 exhibiting the highest positive 
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expenditure change of 21% from 2005 levels to $ US 65.2 Billion. However, from 2006 to 2009 
the absolute amount of public expenditure in agriculture decreased by 12.5% and then 
decreased by 4% in 2010 expenditures of $ US 105.1 billion.  
 





Despite the increase in public expenditures on agriculture in real terms, its share in total 
government expenditures failed to increase over the study period (see Figure 9). The share of 
public expenditures to agriculture in total public expenditures deviated slightly from its of 
average 5.1% over the study period, peaking at 6% in 2006 and being at its lowest of 4.2%.in 
2007. In comparison to other sectors, agriculture as a portion of all public expenditures has 
remained stagnant. By contrast, the share of public expenditures to social protection, mining, 
transport and communications as a proportion of total public expenditures increased by 4.2%, 
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Figure 9: Sectoral Composition of Public Expenditure (1996-2010 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 5 there are regional differences in the share of agriculture in public 
expenditure. For instance the EAP in comparison to other regions agriculture on average has 
the highest share of agriculture expenditures as a portion of public expenditure with 7%. The 
EAP region is followed in descending order by South Asia, SSA, ECA, MENA and LAC 
regions with agriculture on average accounting for 5.3%, 4.7%, 3.5%, 2.9% and 1.1% of total 
government expenditures between 1996 and 2010.   
 
Table 5: Agricultural Public Expenditures verses Agricultural Output (1996-2010) 
Region Share of Agricultural Output in  GDP Share  of Agriculture in  Total Expenditure 
 
1996/8 1999/01 2002/04 2005/07 2008/10 1996/8 1999/01 2002/04 2005/07 2008/10 
EAP 20.4% 18.6% 16.7% 15.4% 15.3% 8.0% 6.7% 6.6% 6.4% 7.4% 
ECA 28.1% 24.0% 20.0% 16.2% 12.9% 6.5% 3.6% 4.5% 0.2% 2.8% 
LAC 12.8% 10.7% 10.2% 9.6% 9.4% 1.3% 1.3% 0.8% 0.9% 1.2% 
MENA 15.1% 13.2% 12.9% 11.4% 11.0% 2.0% 3.6% 3.5% 3.7% 1.7% 
SOUTH ASIA 28.6% 26.9% 25.3% 22.7% 22.0% 4.6% 4.7% 3.9% 5.4% 7.6% 
SSA 35.7% 32.9% 31.4% 29.9% 29.5% 3.8% 5.1% 4.3% 4.9% 5.2% 
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The study also found significant differences between the rate of change in public expenditures 
and agricultural output. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa between 1996 and 2010, 
agriculture’s share of GDP decreased by 6% as compared to the slight increase of 1% in public 
expenditures in the sector. In other regions public expenditures as well as agricultural output 
decreased over time albeit at different rates. For example, the ECA region experienced the most 
considerable decline in the share of total spending to agriculture with a decline of nearly 4% 
percent of total government expenditures. The ECA region also experienced an even larger 
decrease in agricultural output from contributing 28% to GDP in 1996 to 12.9% in 2010.  
 
4.3.3 Government Revenues 
For the purposes of this paper we focused on analysing the tax revenue and ODA components 
of total government revenues. Thus, public debt and other non-ODA or non-tax revenues were 
excluded from the analysis and therefore are not presented in these results. In section 4.3.4 total 
and agriculture aid flows are discussed in further detail. 
 
For the period 1996 to 2010, in low- and middle-income countries tax revenues accounted for 
an average of 16% of total GDP, whilst ODA accounted for 14% of total GDP. Table 6 shows 
annual figures for tax revenues and ODA as a percentage of GDP, disaggregated by income 
group.  
Table 6: Total ODA verses Tax Revenues (1996-2010) 
Year 
 
ODA as a % GDP 
  















1996 10% 4% 2% 13% 16% 19% 
1997 10% 4% 2% 14% 16% 19% 
1998 19% 8% 3% 11% 14% 19% 
1999 12% 6% 3% 11% 14% 20% 
2000 10% 3% 2% 12% 14% 22% 
2001 8% 4% 2% 11% 14% 21% 
2002 20% 7% 4% 11% 14% 18% 
2003 18% 6% 3% 11% 14% 17% 
2004 18% 6% 2% 12% 15% 19% 
2005 15% 6% 1% 12% 16% 19% 
2006 16% 6% 2% 12% 17% 22% 
2007 21% 5% 3% 12% 17% 21% 
2008 22% 6% 2% 12% 18% 22% 
2009 195% 55% 15% 12% 14% 19% 
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As illustrated in Table 6, low-income countries have the highest shares of ODA in GDP with 
an average of 29% as compared to 9% and 3% for lower-middle and upper-middle-income 
countries respectively. Across all income groups, there appears to be an increase in ODA during 
the study period, with a notable increase in 2009 in which ODA increased by multiples of 8.86, 
9.16, and 7.5 for low-income, lower-middle and upper-middle-income countries respectively. 
It appears that the 2009 increase in aid levels was due to unexpected shocks as aid revenue 
decreased significantly the following year.  
 
In order of descending magnitude, tax revenue accounted an average of 12%, 15% and 20% of 
GDP in upper-middle, lower-middle and low-income countries respectively over 1996-2010. 
Unlike ODA, tax revenue over the study period has largely been stagnant with only slight 
deviations about observed averages across income groups. Even in 2009, when ODA across all 
income groups increased by an average of 705%, tax revenues increased by only 16%.   
 
4.3.3.1 Trend of Aid Commitments (1996-2010) 
From 1996 total aid to low- and middle-income countries increased by 24.5% to $ US 133.5 
billion in 2010. Between 1996 and 2008 aid commitments grew at an average of 11% and then 
spiked significantly to 960% between 2008 and 2009 (Figure 10). This is probably due to the 
recommitment of donors toward poverty alleviation and food security following the 2007/2008 
food crisis.  
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When the composition of aid flows were broken down by income group and geographic region, 
the study found that low-income groups and the sub-Saharan region received an increasing 
majority of aid. As illustrated in Figure 11, over 1996-2010 ODA accounted for a significant 
proportion of national income in low-income countries as compared to lower-middle and upper-
middle-income countries. Specifically, on average ODA accounted for 18% of total GDP in 
low-income countries as compared to 2% and 0.5% in lower-middle-income and upper-middle-
income countries respectively. This is especially apparent in 2009 whereby in line with ODA 
commitment surge the amount of ODA received in low-income as a portion of GDP was 115% 
which was a marked increase from the previous year whereby ODA accounted for 11% of GDP.  
 
 
Figure 11: ODA as a share of GDP across different income groups 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 12 the regional distribution of ODA recipients appears to have shifted 
over the study period. This can be seen in trends of the share of ODA to the EAP region which 
reduced by 50% during 1996-2010, whereby in 1996 EAP accounted for the largest share of 
ODA flows at 31% and has subsequently reduced its share of ODA flows to 16%. Similarly, 
flows of ODA to the LAC and MENA regions decreased from 1996 to 2010, with the change 
in shares of ODA flows to these regions decreasing by 38% and 35% respectively. In contrast, 
the shares of ODA to the sub-Saharan and ECA region increased significantly. The share of 
total aid to SSA increased from 22% in 1996 to 36% in 2010, whilst the share of aid to ECA 
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Figure 12: Distribution of ODA across various regions (1996-2010) 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Trend of Aid to Agriculture (1996-2010) 
 
A illustrated in Figure 13, by 2010 aid to agriculture  increased significantly from 1996 levels, 
with aid flows increasing by 162% to $US 8 795 072 287.33. However, the increase in aid to 
2010 levels has been marked by erratic changes in volumes during the period under review. 
More specifically, the three year average of change in the volume of aid commitments to 
agriculture decreased by 6% during 1996-1999, increased by 13% during 2000-2002; decreased 
by 7% between 2003 -2005; and then increased again by19% in between 2006-2008. Most 
notable, is the significant surge of aid to agriculture in 2009 of 1043% from 2008 to $US 33 
913 436 011.69 which was proceeded by decrease in the proceeding year by 74% which was 
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Figure 13: Total Aid Commitments to Agriculture (1996-2010) 
 
Over and above the increase in the sheer volume of aid to agriculture during the period 1996-
2010 there appears to be a change in the distribution, composition, modality as well as donors 
of aid to agriculture.  
 
As depicted in Figure 14, the distribution of aid across regions has changed with sub-Saharan 
Africa receiving the majority of aid to agriculture in 2010 whereas previously in 1996 the 
majority of aid to agriculture was given to the EAP region. More specifically, sub-Saharan has 
experienced the highest increase in aid to agriculture, as can be seen in 1996 where it accounted 
for only 15.6% of aid flows to agriculture which significantly increased to 43.9% by 2010. In 
the same vain, increasingly aid to agriculture has been targeted to the ECA region with its 
portion of aid flows to agriculture increasing to 4.5% in 2010 from 0.5% in 1996. In contrast, 
aid flows to agriculture have decreased in other regions most notably the fraction of aid to 
agriculture destined for the EAP region has decreased by 62% from 1996 to 11.1% in 2010. 
Similarly, aid flows to the LAC, South Asia and MENA decreased from 1996 levels with the 
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Figure 14: Distribution of Aid to Agriculture across various regions 
 
 
When disaggregating aid to agriculture by purpose, the study found that in the period 1996-
2010, agricultural policy and administration management, agricultural water resources and 
agricultural development accounted for the majority of aid to agriculture (see Figure 15).  
Agricultural policy and administration management, agricultural water resources and 
agricultural development collectively contributed 51% of aid to agriculture with each 
accounting for 15%, 17% and 20% respectively. However, as indicated in Appendix D, the 
composition of agricultural aid changed, signalling the shifting ideology of donors in so far as 
to how they enable agricultural development. Although aid to water sources contributes a 
significant portion of total aid to agriculture over the 14 years under review, its share year on 
year has declined whereby on average between 1996 and 1998 it accounted for 25% of aid to 
agriculture however by 2010 this portion decreased to 16% of total aid to agriculture.  Other 
agricultural areas that received a reduction in aid include agricultural inputs, financial services 
as well as a majority of slows to the fisheries and forestry sub-sectors.  Agricultural 
development which includes aid intended for integrated projects and farm development had the 
highest increase in the share of aid to agriculture .Agricultural development accounted on 
average 8% of aid flows to agriculture between1996-1998 and increased significantly to 
account for 22% between 2008-2010. Similarly, aid flows to agricultural alternative 
development which funds the reduction of illicit drug cultivation through other agricultural 
marketing and production opportunities (e.g. cultivation of poppy for heroin) increased 
significantly. This is especially apparent for countries that have high illicit drug cultivation and 
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commercialisation such as Afghanistan and Columbia which collectively accounted for an 
average of 70% of aid flows to agricultural alternative development between 2008 and 2010.   
 
Figure 15: Composition of Aid to Agriculture by Purpose (% of Total Aid to Agriculture) 
 
*Other  comprises of all purpose codes whose individual percentage is less than 1%, namely Forestry, purpose unspecified or does not fit under any other applicable codes; Agriculture, 
combination of purposes in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing; Fishing policy and administrative management; Forestry policy and administrative management; Agriculture, purpose unspecified 
or does not fit under any other applicable codes; Agricultural services, purpose; Forestry education/training; Forestry research; Fuel wood/charcoal; Agricultural policy and administrative 
management; Forestry services; Fishery research; Fishery education/training; Plant/post-harvest prot. & pest ctrl 
 
As illustrated in Figure 16, in the period 1996-2010 the largest donors of aid to agriculture have 
been the United States, Japan, European Communities (EC) and Germany which collectively 
accounted for two thirds of total aid to agriculture. However, as indicated in Appendix E when 
looking at the year on year changes in donor commitments the study found that some donors 
over time changed their commitments to agriculture. For example, United States exhibited a 
significant increase in their share of commitment to aid to agriculture (from 2.8% in 1996 to 
32.5% in 2010) much like the EC (from 2.5% in 1996 to 13.7% in 2010). In contrast Japan’s 
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Figure 16: Composition of Aid to Agriculture by Donor (% of Total Aid to Agriculture) 
 
*Other  comprises of all donors  whose individual percentage is less than 1%, namely World Food Program (WFP); United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF);Greece; 
Portugal; New Zealand; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Luxembourg; Austria 
 
Figure 17 presents trends of agricultural aid according to their composition (grant verses loan). 
Increasingly over the period 1996-2010 the modality of choice for administering aid to 
agriculture amongst donors was grants, in particular bilateral grants. Whilst bilateral grants 
accounted for 36% of total aid to agriculture in 1996 they increased to 74% by end of 2010 and 
peaked at 76% in 2009. Similarly, multilateral grants increased from accounting for 3% of total 
aid to 12 % in 2010. In contrast, aid in the form of loans decreased over time with bilateral 
loans decreasing from accounting for 62% of total aid in 1996 to 12% in 2010 whilst aid to 
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Figure 17: Composition of Aid to Agriculture by Modality (% of Total Aid to Agriculture) 
 
 
4.4 Empirical Analysis Results 
4.4.1 Fungibility Study Results 
We firstly present the results of the regression diagnostics tests were conducted prior to the 
fungibility analysis. The results were used to assess if the extent to which data met regression 
assumptions and in so doing finalise which panel regression model would be suitable based on 
the characteristics of the data.  
 
A preliminary panel regression analysis was run with all model variables and error variables 
tested. Using the Dikey Fuller Test, results concluded that the hypothesis that error terms are 
non-stationary could be rejected. More specifically, the t-statistic of -6.4930 significant at 
p<.0010 was less than the critical values of the Dickey-Fuller test (-3.12 -3.41 -3.96 at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant level, respectively), therefore indicating that the data did not exhibit a unit 
root problem and the panel data series was stationary. Although, the data did not violate the 
assumption of stationarity, diagnostic testing found that there was a need to correct or account 
for the   presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms as well as non linearity 
between dependent and independent variables. 
 
Observations of partial regression plots of dependent against independent variables revealed a 
non   linear relationship. Appendix F shows the regression plots after the variables were log 
transformed and indicate that the log transformations to correct for observed non linearity was 
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successful. Given the observed non-linearity of the data the independent and dependent 
variables were log-transformed. Once log transformed, linearity was observed.  
 
The Durbin Watson test which was used to check for the presence of autocorrelation in each 
country’s time series data was found to be significant. The first order Durbin –Watson of .9913 
(<2) was highly significant (p<.0001) as such the null hypothesis for the existence of no first 
order autocorrelation in the panel of countries was rejected.  As suggested by previous 
fungibility studies (Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu, 1998; Fan & Rao, 2003; Affairs, 2009; Lu et 
al., 2010; Sijpe, 2010; Marc, 2012), the dependent variable was lagged in order to correct for 
autocorrelation. As per results of the Lagrange Multiplier test, there was also strong evidence 
of ARCH effects (p-value <0.0001).  
 
In order to account for the inclusion of a lagged regress in the model a dynamic panel data 
model needed to be used. In addition, the chosen dynamic panel data model would need to also 
account for the presence of heteroskedasticity of error variables in the data as well as potential 
endogeneity bias from the correlation between aid to agriculture and error terms of public 
expenditure (i.e. relax strict exogeneity assumption) .In this regard, the Arellano- 
Bover/Blundell-Bond linear generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators was used. This 
particular model is designed for micro panel data, which contains many panels and few time 
periods and prevents endogeneity bias by accounting for the presence of heteroskedasticity 
(allowing for use of lagged variables) and autocorrelation of error terms within panels (Bond, 
2002).   
 
 
Taking into account the transformation of  independent variables and lagging of the dependent 
variable the fungibility  model described in section 3.4.1 was adjusted and the following model 
was estimated:   
 
InAGEt = β0AG + InAGEt-1+ Inβ1AGGDPt + Inβ2AG AAG t + Inβ3AGG+ Inβ4AGEMGt + + Ɛ 
AG 
where,  
AGEt  = Log of per capita public expenditures to agriculture  
AGEt-1= 1 year Lagged per capita public expenditures to agriculture  
GDPt = Log of per capita GDP 
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AAGt  = Log of per capita aid to agriculture 
EMGt  = Log of emergency food aid 
Table 7 presents aggregate fungibility results for a sample of 605 observations consisting of 
time series data from 1996 to 2010. Although the full data set covers 66 countries,  due to 
missing data the study run fungibility analysis on a subset of the full sample which consists of 
countries that at minimum had two full years of cross sectional data. Therefore, in addition to 
removing influential data observations, Zimbabwe, Mali and Sudan were removed from the 
analysis leading to only 63 countries being included in the regression analysis. 
Table 7: Main Fungibility Study Panel Regression Results (1996-2010) 
Variable Estimate p  value 
Log of ODA to agriculture per capita 0.032964 <.0001 
Log  of GDP per capita -0.89304 <.0001 
Food aid 0.120201 0.0001 
Log of Governance 0.16474 0.0066 
Number of Countries 63 
 
 
Given the log-log specification of the fungibility model, the coefficient of independent 
variables presented in Table 7 are partial elasticity estimates to the dependent variable. That is, 
the coefficients indicate the percentage change of public agriculture expenditure given a 
percentage change in an independent variable holding all other independent variables constant.  
 
Table 7 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between agricultural public 
spending per capita and the per capita net ODA commitments to agriculture, where the  null 
hypothesis of no fungibility is strongly rejected (p<.0001).  However the small positive 
coefficient indicates evidence of near full fungibility of agricultural aid whereby an increase in 
donor funding leads to a less than proportionate increase in public expenditure in agriculture. 
More specifically, in low- and middle-income countries, a one percent increase in donor 
funding for agriculture leads to a mere .03% increase in public spending in the sector, 
independent of changes in GDP per capita, quality of governance as well as  country and year 
-specific effects. As expected, GDP per capita is conversely related to government agriculture 
expenditures. The study found that collectively for low- and middle-income countries, a 1 
percent increase in GDP per capita resulted in a decrease of .89 percent in agricultural public 
expenditures, holding all else constant. In addition, the relationship between public 
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expenditures and governance was found to be significantly positive, with a one percent 
increment in the corruption index leading to a .16% increase in public expenditures. 
 
The study included two sub analyses that aimed to test if the relationship between aid and public 
expenditure differed according to income group and quality of institutional governance.  
 
To examine if differences existed between countries according to income levels, the  sample of 
63 countries were split into two main groups, the first included low- and lower-middle-income 
countries (GDP per capita of no more than $3,975 in 2010) and the second upper-middle-
income countries (GDP per capita of no more than $12,275 in 2010).The results are reported in 
Table 8 and contain model estimates for a group of 44 low- and lower-middle-income countries 
and another group of 19 upper-middle-income countries. Results of the sub analysis indicated 
that coefficient estimates differed for the different income groups. However, given that the 
sample for upper-middle-income countries was quite small the model was limited in its 
explanatory power.  The positive relationship between aid and public expenditure to agriculture 
was consistent in both income groups, with the magnitude of the coefficient being similar. This 
is to say, low- and middle-income countries exhibited similar levels of partial fungibility with 
a 1% increase in aid to agriculture resulting in a .01 % and .02% increase in public expenditure 
respectively. The relationship between public expenditure and other model variables was 
significantly more pronounced and different across the different income group. For instance, a 
1% increase in GDP per capita in the upper-middle-income group led to a more than 
proportionate decrease in public expenditure of 1.12% as compared to the other income group 
where a similar increase in GDP capita led to 0.63% in public expenditure reduced.  
Table 8: Fungibility sub Analysis (by Income Group) Results   (1996-2010) 
 
Low and Lower-middle-
income Countries  
Upper-middle-income 
Countries 
Variable Estimate p  value Estimate p  value 
Log of ODA to agriculture per capita 0.014929 0.0149 0.023561 0.3037 
Log  of GDP per capita -0.63981 0.0002 -1.13352 0.2442 
Food aid 0.450485 <.0001 0.020238 0.8307 
Log of Governance 0.582919 <.0001 -0.40708 0.1789 
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The model estimated in Table 8 suggests that the effect of aid to agriculture on public 
expenditures in the sector can be amplified by the level of institutional quality.  To test this 
premise further, the second sub analyses focused on investigating if fungibility would be most 
evident for a subset of countries identified to have low levels of institutional governance as 
compared to another perceived to have better governance. To do this, the full sample set of 66 
countries were ranked according to their average governance index for the study period and 
split between the top and the bottom 50th percentile of the sample. Table 9 presents the 
regression results of two sub samples of countries, one with relatively poor institutional quality 
(governance index in the bottom 50th Quantile) and the other higher institutional quality 
(governance index in the top 50th Quantile) The results indicate the magnitude of the effect of 
aid on public expenditures in the agriculture sector in countries with relatively week and good 
quality is largely the same with both results not deviating much from the main results. This is 
to say, a 1% in aid to agriculture leads to 0.02% and 0.03% increase in agricultural public 
spending in countries with low and high institutional quality respectively. However, it must be 
noted that the results of fungibility for countries with relatively week institutional quality were 
not significant, largely due to the availability of data as can be seen by number of observations. 
 
Table 9: Fungibility sub Analysis (by institutional quality) Results 
 
Lowest Half  Top Half  
Variable Estimate p  value Estimate p  value 
Log of ODA to agriculture per capita 0.025391       0.1570 0.035378      0.00698        
Log  of GDP per capita 1.722783       0.0660 -0.55393       0.2461       
Food aid 0.333324       <.0001 -0.01406       0.0429       
Log of Governance 0.356788       0.0009 0.283358       0.0354        
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4.4.2 Fiscal Response Study Result 
In the same vain as the fungibility results, we first present our results of the regression 
diagnostics tests were conducted prior to the fungibility analysis.  
 
A preliminary panel regression analysis was run with all model variables and error variables 
tested. Using the Dikey Fuller Test, results concluded that the hypothesis that error terms are 
non-stationary could be rejected. More specifically, the t-statistic of -6.3519 significant at 
p<.0010 was less than the critical values of the Dickey-Fuller test (-3.12 -3.41 -3.96 at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant level, respectively), therefore indicating that the data did not exhibit a unit 
root problem and the panel data series was stationary. However, diagnostic testing did find that 
residual terms were hetereskadtic and auto correlated as well as non linearity between 
dependent and independent variables. 
 
Both independent and dependent variables were log transformed in order to account for the 
observed non linear relationship between independent and dependent variables in both partial 
regression plots and correlation matrix. Appendix G shows the regression plots after the 
variables were log transformed and indicate that the log transformations to correct for observed 
non linearity was successful. The Durbin Watson test statistic was found 0.428 (<2) to be 
significant (p <.0001), meaning that the null hypothesis for the existence of no first order 
autocorrelation in the panel of countries was rejected. To correct for this we lagged the 
dependent variable by a year. As per results of the Lagrange Multiplier test, there was also 
strong evidence of ARCH effects (p-value <0.0001). 
 
Similar to the fungibility study, we relaxed the strict exogeneity assumption and instead 
accounted for the dynamic nature of the panel data (presence of lagged repressor). As such the 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators was 
used especially given that the panel model used was micro panel data comprising of few time 
periods (15) relative to the number of panels (63).Taking into account the transformation of 
independent variables and lagging of the dependent variable the fungibility model described in 
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InT/ GDP = β0+ β1InAGR + β2In IND + β3InINCOME+ β4InGRANT + β5InLOAN + β6InM + β7InX + Ɛ 
where,  
T/ GDP  = tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
AGR   = Agriculture output as a percentage of GDP 
IND  = Industry output as a percentage of GDP 
INCOME = GDP per capita 
GRANT = Total aid grant as a percentage of GDP 
LOAN  = Total loan grant as a percentage of GDP 
 
Given the newly revised log-log specification of the model, the coefficient of independent 
variables are partial elasticity estimates indicating the percentage change of tax revenue given 
a percentage change in an independent variable, holding all else constant.  
 
Like the fungibility analysis, a sub set of the full sample of 66 countries was used. Due to 
missing time series tax data, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Malawi, Tonga, Swaziland, Ecuador and 
Mozambique were removed from the analysis and a final data set of 59 countries were used.  
As presented in Table 10, total ODA has a negative impact on tax revenues. In particular, a 1% 
increase in total aid during 1996 to 2010 led to a 0.005% decrease in tax revenues. Regression 
results also indicated that the other variables included in the model significantly determined tax 
revenues in low- and middle-income countries. For instance, increase in agriculture output led 
to a decrease in tax revenue of .029% in contrast, a 1% increase in industrial output led to an 
increase in tax revenue of 0.39%. Import and exports output both had a significant and positive 
impact on tax revenue. The coefficient on GDP per capita is significant but negative, with a 1% 
increase in GDP per capita leading to a 0.15% decrease in tax revenue.  
Table 10: Main Fiscal Response Study Panel Regression Results (1996-2010) 
Variable Estimate p  value 
 







Imports  as a % of GDP 0.24899 <.0001 
Exports as a % of GDP 0.105533 <.0001 
Total ODA  as a % of GDP -0.00536 0.0041 
Agriculture Output as a % GDP -0.29822 <.0001 
GDP per capita -0.14863 0.0369 
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When aid is disaggregated by type, the regression analysis found that where as ODA loans had 
a significantly positive impact on tax revenue; grants had significantly negative impact on tax 
revenue. More specifically, a 1% increase in ODA loans was found to increase tax revenue by 
.004%, whilst a similar increase in ODA grants led to a decrease in tax revenue by .01%. Trade 
regressors of import and export were significantly and positively related with tax revenue 
although the magnitude of the impact of imports was s slightly greater than for exports. This is 
to say, holding all else constant a 1 percent increase in import leads to an increase in tax revenue 
by .16% in comparison to a .14% increase in tax revenue due to an equal increase in export 
output. As expected, economic structure appears to have a statistically significant impact on tax 
revenue. In particular, a 1 % increase in agricultural output led to a 0.22% decrease in tax 
revenue whilst an increase in output from the industrial sector led to an increase in tax revenue 
of 0.39%. The coefficient on GDP per capita is significant but negative, with a 1% increase in 
GDP per Capita leading to a 0.1% decrease in tax revenue.  
 
 
Table 11: Fiscal Response sub Analysis (by disaggregated aid) Results   (1996-2010) 
Variable Estimate p  value 
 





Imports  as a % of GDP 0.157212 <.0001 
Exports as a % of GDP 0.14292 <.0001 
ODA  Grants as a % of GDP -0.01442 <.0001 
ODA  Loans as a % of GDP 0.004359 <.0001 
Agriculture Output as a % GDP -0.22373 <.0001 
GDP per capita -0.10983 0.0201 
 
To examine if there are differences in the determinants of tax revenue according to the income 
level of a country, the sample of 59 countries was split into low- and lower-middle-income 
countries (GDP per capita of no more than $3 975 in 2010) and upper-middle-income countries 
(GDP per capita of no more than $12 275 in 2010).The results are reported in Table 12 and 
indicate that difference in coefficient estimates in the different income country groups. As a 
caveat it must be noted that the upper-middle-income group had a much smaller sample of 17 
countries and as such the validity and therefore inference from model results must be viewed 
with some level of precaution.  There are significant differences in aid variable regressors: for 
low- and lower-middle-income aid grants are significantly negative but loans are positive and 
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insignificant; whilst for upper-middle-income countries loan and grant aid are both positive and 
statistically insignificant. The aid grant coefficient for low – and lower-middle-income 
countries appears to be similar to the results in the main regression analysis results, with a 1% 
increase in grant aid leading to a decrease in tax revenue by .01%. Contrary to study 
expectations, the coefficient for agriculture output which is significant for both income groups 
suggest that increase in agricultural sector would result in a larger magnitude reduction in tax 
revenues as countries became relatively richer. This is to say,   a 1% increase in agricultural 
output in upper-middle-income countries led to a .75% decrease in tax revenue in contrast to 
reduction in revenue of 0.24% in low-lower-middle-income countries. 
 






Variable Estimate p  value Estimate p  value 
 
Industry Output as a % of GDP 0.257338 0.6696 0.057127 0.2348 
Imports  as a % of GDP 0.340871 0.1610 0.174874 0.0045 
Exports as a % of GDP 0.24344 0.3943 0.096669 0.1449 
ODA  Grants as a % of GDP 0.031607 0.2562 -0.01233 0.0006 
ODA  Loans as a % of GDP 0.002786 0.6617 0.001009 0.5577 
Agriculture Output as a % GDP -0.75358 0.0351 -0.23737 <.0001 
GDP per capita 0.297382 0.8488 0.21077 0.1609 
   
  
Number of Countries 17 42 
 
4.5 Discussion  
This study has shown agriculture remains an important economic sector in many low- and 
middle-income countries. Nearly 40% of economic output in low-income countries is derived 
from the agriculture sector, roughly double the average in lower-middle-income countries and 
four times higher than the average in upper-middle-income countries. However, despite the 
importance of agriculture in these economies, the share of government expenditure on 
agriculture has decreased over time. To help understand why this trend is occurring, this study 
has explored factors that affect the share of government expenditure committed to agriculture. 
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Several factors appear to be involved, including the fungibility of this aid and its impact on tax 
revenues. 
 
For example, the declining share of agriculture in total government spending appears to signal 
a shift in government priorities in some economies towards other sectors such as transport, 
communication and education. This trend is likely to be most prominent for the wealthier subset 
of developing countries that are transitioning away from an agriculture-based economy toward 
a more industrial-based economy. We have found evidence of this shift in our sample of upper-
middle-income countries, where agricultural output decreased and industrial output increased 
over time. Despite this shift, many low- and middle-income countries remain large recipients 
of ODA. In fact ODA to the agriculture sector has increased in recent years, especially since 
the recent world food crisis. The increase in agricultural aid and concomitant decline in the 
share of government expenditure on agriculture is interesting because it may indicate that 
agricultural aid is fungible. Indeed previous studies that have shown ministries of agriculture 
often do not increase public expenditures by the full amount of inflows of aid to the sector 
(Seifa Gebrehanna, 2007). Our analysis supports this finding and indicates that aid to 
agriculture is partially fungible. Specifically, a 1% increase in aid to agriculture led to a less 
than proportionate increase in public expenditures of 0.03%. From the perspective of the donor 
community, this suggests that to increase government expenditure in agriculture by $1, donors 
would need to provide a minimum of $1.97 of development assistance.  
 
The observed fungibility was even more pronounced in low-income countries, in which 0.99 
cents of each of aid dollar was treated as fungible, suggesting that if donors wanted to increase 
public expenditure by $1 they would need to commit $1.99 dollars of aid. Thus, initiatives such 
the “L’Aquila Food Security Initiative” (AFSI), where G8 leaders agreed to pledge $22 billion 
in agricultural aid over three years for the world’s poorest countries, would actually require a 
minimum of $43.78 billion to ensure $22 billion would be successfully channelled through 
ministries and spent on agriculture. This level of fungibility would undoubtedly undermine 
efforts to provide additional funding to develop the sector and raise living standards of citizens 
reliant on income from agriculture. 
 
A common view among development scholars and the international donor community is that 
fungibility is symptomatic of poor institutional quality in recipient governments. Development 
finance institutions such as the World Bank have echoed this sentiment and called for greater 
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selectivity in the allocation of aid, emphasizing that aid be committed to countries that exhibit 
good governance, as these countries would be more likely use aid for its intended purposes 
(World Bank, 1998). However, this study found that there was no difference in fungibility when 
we stratified our sample into groups defined by quality of governance. Though our results for 
poorly governed countries (those with governance scores below the 50th percentile) were not 
statistically significant, this finding is consistent with Pettersson (2007) who has also studied 
the influence of institutional quality on levels of fungibility, albeit for total aid rather than 
agricultural aid. It is unclear then whether fungibility of agricultural aid is a sign of malicious 
intent or a phenomenon unique to economies with poor governance. Using quality of 
governance as a yardstick to decide which countries receive aid is therefore problematic, as this 
may not be a reliable measure of fungibility or the productivity of fungible funds.  
 
Although this study did not explore how fungible funds were used or their productivity, it 
appears donor and recipient views often differ on matters concerning the need, best use and 
management of agricultural aid. For example, the fungibility of agricultural aid may indicate a 
divergence in funding preferences between recipient governments and donors, suggesting 
donor priorities no longer align with the needs of recipient governments. This was illustrated 
in a recent study of AFSI donors (ActionAid, 2012) which showed that only 17% of total 
agricultural aid was directed toward the top 25 countries with the highest levels of chronic 
hunger and food insecurity. It may be understandable then that countries without a pressing 
need for agricultural aid choose to redirect the additional revenue toward other priority sectors. 
This phenomenon is taking place in upper-middle-income countries which remain large 
recipients of agricultural aid but are shifting away from an agriculture-based economy. 
 
Another reason for the fungibility of aid may stem from the cross-cutting nature of some ODA. 
For example, aid that is targeted towards rural development or emergency food relief may not 
be considered agricultural aid by donors, but governments may see such funds as overlapping 
and supplementing agricultural aid, leading them to treat aid to agriculture as fungible. 
Although these excluded items may not directly contribute toward agricultural development, 
they do so indirectly by supporting the livelihood farmers in low-income and middle-income 
who live predominately in rural areas and will benefit from improved rural infrastructure such 
as roads to access markets, or food aid when crops fail. Expanding the definition of agricultural 
aid to include rural development and food aid would lead to substantial increases in aid to 
agriculture, from $4.8 billion in to $12 billion in 2007 alone (DAC, 2010). Given these 
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similarities, it seems cash constrained governments receiving rural development aid and food 
assistance may therefore use a portion of official aid to agriculture as fungible and divert it 
toward other uses.   
 
A third explanation for the observed fungibility considers both the ability of the recipient public 
ministry to manage aid inflows and of donors to monitor aid disbursed. Previous studies have 
suggested that as the proportion of aid in public expenditure rises, donors monitor the spending 
of aid more carefully and fungibility decreases (Pack & Pack, 1990, 1993). Our findings do not 
support this conclusion however. We saw fungibility is highest in low-income countries and 
that as the share of aid to agriculture increases so to do the levels of fungibility in the sector. 
Since this aid was disbursed from a numerous donors, it appears that a lack of coordination 
among donors may be reducing the monitoring of funds, making it easier for ministries of 
agriculture to divert incoming aid to other sectors. We also found the composition of aid to 
agriculture has shifted away from support for policy and administrative management. Without 
this support, ministries may lack the institutional and managerial capacity needed to scale-up 
the activities required to absorb large inflows of aid. To reduce the diversion of agricultural aid, 
it seems donors should renew their support for strengthening the institutional capacity of 
agricultural ministries and focus more resources on coordination and monitoring activities with 
other donors. 
 
In addition to our analysis of fungibility, to understand why the share of government 
expenditure on agriculture has decreased over time we also explored the role of aid and its 
impact on tax revenue. Aid may distort incentives for governments to raise taxes, and this can 
indirectly affect public expenditures, particularly in hard to tax sectors which rely on tax 
revenue collected from other sources. Agriculture appears to be one of these hard to tax sectors, 
as we found a significant negative relationship between agricultural output and tax revenue, 
such that a 1% increase in agricultural output led to a decrease in tax revenue of 0.30%. This 
may be due to the often non-commercial nature of agriculture in many low- and middle-income 
countries, though one would expect tax revenues to increase as commercial farming expands. 
The results of our fiscal response study suggest aid may indeed distort incentives for 
governments to raise taxes, as we found evidence of a significant negative relationship between 
total aid and tax revenue effort. These findings are similar to previous estimates (Gupta et al., 
2003) and show that a 1% increase in total aid led to a 0.01% decrease in tax revenue. However, 
the composition of aid shows us that ODA loans increase domestic resource mobilisation while 
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ODA grants resulted in a reduction in tax revenues. Since most ODA is given as grants, this 
explains the overall negative relationship between agricultural aid and tax revenue. These 
findings are in line with those of previous studies (Mcgillivray & Morrissey, 2001; Gupta et al., 
2003; Clist & Morrissey, 2011) which have also found that grants decrease tax revenue. 
However, the observed magnitude (coefficient) of the impact of ODA grant and loans on tax 
revenue differed from previous research, most probably due to the use of different data sources 
and sample sizes.  
 
Another impact of ODA grants on tax revenues may be that they reinforce the aid dependency 
cycle. In other words, if grants inadvertently distort incentives to increase tax revenue, this 
could lead to chronic public underinvestment in agriculture and aid recipients struggling to 
wean off of aid funding. This dependence on aid may account for the decrease in agricultural 
expenditure that we have observed over time. However, dependence on aid is not a sustainable 
source of revenue, as aid flows can be erratic over time as donor priorities shift. It is clear then 
that donors need to not only concern themselves with aid fungibility but also the fiscal effects 
of aid in general. If aid can distort government incentives and reduce resource mobilisation 
efforts then it may undermine donor efforts to ensure that aid is indeed ‘additive’ and helps to 
increase public expenditure. As much as it is important for donors to monitor incentives of 
recipients, it is equally important for donors to steer away from irresponsible funding habits. 
Recent ‘big aid push’ initiatives that advocate for increased aid volumes  has led to a massive 
influx of foreign aid through the emergence of both  ‘loan pushing’  and ‘grant pushing’, 
whereby development finance institutions lend and provide grants even in cases where it 
inappropriate (Harford & Klein, 2005). For example, in a bid to meet aid volume targets 
development agencies have been found disbursing loans to already heavily indebted, cash 
constrained low-income countries with a small tax base and little capacity to pay back loans. 
Similarly, in a bid to appear to make progress toward international aid targets (i.e. many 
advanced economies aim to disburse 0.7% of GNI as aid), donors have been able to count 
commercial loans as aid. According to the Centre for Global Development (CGD), donors such 
as Japan, Germany and France have been able to profit from disbursing $9 billion in loans 
(counted as aid) raised at low interest rates to recipient countries at higher market rates 
(Roodman, 2014). Thus, the structuring of development finance suggests donors may have a 
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Taken together, our study findings indicate that the observed reduction in public expenditure to 
agriculture is due to the impact of aid at both a sectoral and central government level. Firstly, 
at the ministerial level, aid to the sector is treated as fungible, whilst at the national level total 
aid received displaces tax effort and may therefore reduce recurrent revenue flowing to the 
agriculture sector. Weak management of public expenditure in recipient countries may be partly 
to blame for this, as well as the actions of donors. It appears that donors and recipients often 
operate in silos, each with their own ideas as to the need, purpose and the expectations of aid 
and its objectives. For donors, measuring the effectiveness of aid should extend beyond the 
ambit of just looking at how much and under what ministerial line item aid is used. Instead, 
donors need to ensure aid is aligned with existing needs, that the receiving ministry has the 
institutional capacity to absorb aid, and they need to monitor both the development as well as 
the fiscal response of aid. In order to do this, donors need to work with recipients to understand 
country needs and the fiscal environment of the receiving government. This may alert donors 
to the potential for aid to service debt, consumption or non-development expenditures. 
Fortunately, recent initiatives such as the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness (2005) and 
related high level forums in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) have advocated for inclusive 
partnerships in which aid recipients have wider participation in setting development policies 
and aid effectiveness is measured using output and impact indicators. 
 
To address the widespread underinvestment in agriculture, we recommend that new innovative 
development finance models be employed. This would be particularly useful in agriculture as 
the sector is often viewed as high risk by investors (i.e. lack of enabling infrastructure such as 
quality road networks and supporting infrastructure), making it difficult to attract private sector 
participants. The health sector offers illustrative examples, as it has managed to successfully 
employ new financing models with the participation of the public, development and private 
sectors. For example, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFI) has risen over 
$1 billion dollars from long-term capital markets to fund immunization programmes in 70 
countries. Similarly, Advance Market Commitments (AMC) have attracted private 
participation into vaccine research by guaranteeing the price of vaccines once developed (I-8 
Group, 2012). Even if grants and loans are still to be used, tweaking how they are structured 
can ensure public expenditures are maximised and distortive fiscal effects are minimised. 
Harford & Klein (2005) suggest that a hybrid of loans and grants can be used in which aid can 
consist of a grant component with an option for recipients to borrow additional funds at market 
rate, allowing them to borrow an amount that they can afford. Loans could also be provided 
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and over time be converted to grants provided certain predetermined development outcomes 
are met. These innovative funding tools offer the chance to encourage public expenditure in 
agriculture, ensuring the risks and rewards of investing in agriculture are jointly owned and 
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5 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
The agriculture sector in developing countries is often subject to market failures and 
inefficiencies that make it dependent on public-sector investment. Yet agricultural output and 
public spending on agriculture is in decline. This is despite large inflows of aid at both at the 
sectoral and national levels. To understand why these trends are occurring, we examined factors 
that affect the share of government spending on agriculture. 
 
Firstly, we undertook a fungibility study of 63 countries using time series data (1996-2010) to 
ascertain the impact of agricultural aid on public expenditure to agriculture. We found high 
levels of fungibility, with agricultural aid in low-and middle-income countries being partially 
fungible. However, our sub-analysis revealed that fungibility of agricultural aid may not 
indicate malicious intent of recipient governments as countries with good governance were also 
found to treat agricultural aid as fungible. Given these findings, we argue against policy 
recommendations that advocate for donors to avoid providing aid to countries or sectors that 
treat aid as fungible. Instead, we suggest fungibility of agricultural aid signals that there are 
differences in the priorities of donors and recipients and the policy focus should rather be on 
understanding and aligning these opposing views.  
 
Secondly, our fiscal response study investigated the impact of total aid on tax effort for 59 
countries in which the agriculture sector was a significant contributor to GDP. We found total 
aid displaced tax efforts, and that the incentives of recipient governments may be distorted by 
the composition of aid, with ODA grants leading to decreases in tax revenues and ODA loans 
having the opposite effect. Since most aid is disbursed as ODA grants, donors may be 
inadvertently contributing to aid dependency as these inflows result in reduced resource 
mobilisation. These results are concerning because aid is an unsustainable source of income, 
yet it may be contributing to decreases in recurrent spending by governments and even further 
under investment in the agriculture sector.  
 
Given the results of our fungibility and fiscal response studies, it seems donors and governments 
should focus on making the agriculture sector a more conducive environment for private 
investors. In other words, they should rather target the root causes of why public and donor 
funding is needed in the first place. It is worth considering the potential of innovative financing 
mechanisms to overcome market failures that lead to reduced private investment. This can be 
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done by government and donors jointly sharing in the risks needed to ensure that private 
investors are able to lower their risks and costs of capital formation. This would ensure that the 
agriculture sector is no longer at the mercy of donor and public funding preferences which shift 
over time and rarely align. There needs to be a greater focus on making sure the sector moves 
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1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Based on the findings of our fiscal response and fungibility studies, we believe that there is still 
room for further research. First, our studies looked at the impact of aid over a relatively short 
time period (15 years), and time series data were often missing for individual countries. Since 
aid may have long-term effects on fiscal aggregates, it would be worth repeating this analysis 
with panel data that covers a longer period of time and uses multiple imputation to deal with 
missing data. Secondly, it would be worth exploring the fiscal response of aid at the sectoral 
level as our study was restricted to the national level. This could be done to explore whether 
aid crowds out borrowing or tax revenue efforts at the ministerial level in the agriculture sector. 
Lastly, since our analysis relied on DAC definitions of agricultural aid, research could be 
undertaken to understand the impact of all aid flows that may fall under the umbrella of 
agricultural development (including rural development) and check if the same levels of 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A:   OECD Functional Classification of Expenditures for Agriculture  
 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY. FISHING AND HUNTING 
(i)Agriculture 
 
- Administration of agricultural affairs and services; conservation, reclamation, or 
expansion of arable land; agrarian reform and land settlement; supervision and regulation 
of the agricultural industry 
- Construction or operation of flood control, irrigation, and drainage systems, including 
grants, loans, or subsidies for such works 
- Operation or support of programs or schemes to stabilize or improve farm prices and 
farm incomes; operation or support of extension services or veterinary services to farmers, 
pest control services, crop inspection services, and crop grading services 
- Production and dissemination of general information, technical documentation, and 
statistics on agricultural affairs and services 
- Compensation, grants, loans, or subsidies to farmers in connection with agricultural 
activities, including payments for restricting or encouraging output of a particular crop or 
for allowing land to remain uncultivated 
 
(ii) Forestry  - Administration of forestry affairs and services; conservation, extension, and rationalized 
exploitation of forest reserves; supervision and regulation of forest operations and 
issuance of tree-felling licenses 
- Operation or support of reforestation work, pest and disease control, forest fire-fighting 
and fire-prevention services, and extension services to forest operators 
- Production and dissemination of general information, technical documentation, and 
statistics on forestry affairs and services 
- Grants, loans, or subsidies to support commercial forest activities 
 
(iii) Fishing and 
Hunting  
 
- Administration of fishing and hunting affairs and services; protection, propagation, and 
rationalized exploitation of fish and wildlife stocks; supervision and regulation of 
freshwater fishing, coastal fishing, ocean fishing, fish farming, wildlife hunting, and 
issuance of fishing and hunting licenses 
- Operation or support of fish hatcheries, extension services, stocking, or culling activities 
- Production and dissemination of general information, technical documentation, and 
statistics on fishing and hunting affairs and services 
- Grants, loans, or subsidies to support commercial fishing and hunting activities, including 
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DESCRIPTION NOTES ON COVERAGE 
  311  AGRICULTURE 
31110 Agricultural policy and 
administrative 
management 
Agricultural sector policy, planning and programmes; aid 
to agricultural ministries; institution capacity building and 
advice; unspecified agriculture. 
31120 Agricultural development Integrated projects; farm development. 
31130 Agricultural land 
resources 
Including soil degradation control; soil improvement; 
drainage of water logged areas; soil desalination; 
agricultural land surveys; land reclamation; erosion 





Irrigation, reservoirs, hydraulic structures, ground water 
exploitation for agricultural use. 
31150 Agricultural inputs Supply of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery/equipment. 
31161 Food crop production Including grains (wheat, rice, barley, maize, rye, oats, 
millet, sorghum); horticulture; vegetables; fruit and 
berries; other annual and perennial crops. [Use code 32161 
for agro-industries.] 
31162 Industrial crops/export 
crops 
Including sugar; coffee, cocoa, tea; oil seeds, nuts, kernels; 
fibre crops; tobacco; rubber.  [Use code 32161 for agro-
industries.] 
31163 Livestock Animal husbandry; animal feed aid. 
31164 Agrarian reform Including agricultural sector adjustment. 
31165 Agricultural alternative 
development 
Projects to reduce illicit drug cultivation through other 
agricultural marketing and production opportunities (see 
code 43050 for non-agricultural alternative development). 




31182 Agricultural research Plant breeding, physiology, genetic resources, ecology, 
taxonomy, disease control, agricultural bio-technology; 
including livestock research (animal health, breeding and 
genetics, nutrition, physiology). 
31191 Agricultural services Marketing policies & organisation; storage and 
transportation, creation of strategic reserves. 
31192 Plant and post-harvest 
protection and pest 
control 
Including integrated plant protection, biological plant 
protection activities, supply and management of 
agrochemicals, supply of pesticides, plant protection 
policy and legislation. 
31193 Agricultural financial 
services 
Financial intermediaries for the agricultural sector 
including credit schemes; crop insurance. 
31194 Agricultural co-
operatives 
Including farmers’ organisations. 
 31195 Livestock/veterinary 
services 










DESCRIPTION NOTES ON COVERAGE 
31210 Forestry policy and 
administrative 
management 
Forestry sector policy, planning and programmes; 
institution capacity building and advice; forest surveys; 
unspecified forestry and agro-forestry activities. 
31220 Forestry development Afforestation for industrial and rural consumption; 
exploitation and utilisation; erosion control, desertification 
control; integrated forestry projects. 
31261 Fuelwood/charcoal Forestry development whose primary purpose is 




31282 Forestry research Including artificial regeneration, genetic improvement, 
production methods, fertilizer, harvesting. 
31291 Forestry services 
 
 
  313 FISHING 
31310 Fishing policy and 
administrative 
management 
Fishing sector policy, planning and programmes; 
institution capacity building and advice; ocean and coastal 
fishing; marine and freshwater fish surveys and 
prospecting; fishing boats/equipment; unspecified fishing 
activities. 
31320 Fishery development Exploitation and utilisation of fisheries; fish stock 




31382 Fishery research Pilot fish culture; marine/freshwater biological research. 
31391 Fishery services Fishing harbours; fish markets; fishery transport and cold 
storage. 
 


























( East Asia 
and Pacific)  
ECA 





SOUTH ASIA SSA 
(Sub Saharan Africa) 
MENA  
(Middle East and 
North Africa) 
China Albania Argentina Afghanistan Angola Algeria 
Fiji Belarus Bolivia Bangladesh Benin Egypt 
Indonesia Georgia Colombia Bhutan Burkina Faso Morocco 
Malaysia Kyrgyzstan Costa Rica India Burundi Tunisia 
Mongolia Republic of 
Moldova 
Ecuador Nepal Cape Verde 
Turkey 
Philippines Serbia El Salvador Pakistan Central African 
Republic 
 












   
Kenya      
Lesotho      
Liberia      
Malawi      
Mali      
Mozambique      
Namibia      
Niger      
Nigeria      
Rwanda      
Senegal      
Sierra Leone      
Sudan      
Swaziland      
Tanzania      
Togo      
Uganda      









Appendix D:   Breakdown of Agricultural Aid Expenditures 
 
Purpose 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010
Agrarian reform 3% 1% 1% 2% 0%
Agricultural alternative development 1% 0% 9% 11% 7%
Agricultural co-operatives 0% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Agricultural development 8% 11% 13% 12% 22%
Agricultural education/training 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Agricultural extension 0% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Agricultural financial services 5% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Agricultural inputs 10% 7% 4% 3% 2%
Agricultural land resources 4% 8% 5% 3% 2%
Agricultural policy & admin. mgmt 14% 26% 13% 14% 16%
Agricultural policy and administrative management 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Agricultural research 2% 2% 3% 5% 2%
Agricultural services 1% 1% 2% 0% 2%
Agricultural services, purpose 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Agricultural water resources 25% 17% 15% 18% 16%
Agriculture, combination of purposes in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Agriculture, combinations of purposes in Agriculture, Agro-industry, Agribusiness0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Agriculture, purpose unspecified or does not fit under any other applicable codes0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fishery development 2% 1% 2% 2% 3%
Fishery education/training 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fishery research 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fishery services 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
Fishing policy and admin. management 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Fishing policy and administrative management 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Food crop production 5% 3% 2% 2% 5%
Forestry development 9% 7% 14% 13% 4%
Forestry education/training 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Forestry policy & admin. management 2% 4% 4% 2% 4%
Forestry policy and administrative management 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Forestry research 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Forestry services 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Forestry, purpose unspecified or does not fit under any other applicable codes0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fuelwood/charcoal 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Industrial crops/export crops 2% 1% 1% 2% 2%
Livestock 1% 1% 2% 2% 1%
Livestock/veterinary services 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Plant/post-harvest prot. & pest ctrl 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
 
1 
Ritta Shine _SHNRIT001 
 
 

















Donor 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia 1.0% 0.4% 0.5% 2.2% 1.7% 2.6% 2.8% 1.7% 0.9% 1.9% 1.7% 0.7% 1.6% 0.8% 3.1%
Austria 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
Belgium 1.2% 1.3% 1.7% 2.0% 1.8% 1.8% 3.1% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.2% 2.3% 2.5% 3.1% 3.1%
Canada 1.4% 2.8% 1.7% 0.7% 3.2% 1.3% 1.1% 5.1% 10.1% 3.3% 3.6% 2.1% 6.5% 5.4% 7.6%
Denmark 3.7% 5.2% 2.0% 5.8% 8.4% 1.5% 4.3% 0.3% 5.1% 8.4% 3.7% 2.4% 0.9% 1.8% 1.7%
European 
Communities (EC) 2.5% 1.1% 3.9% 7.8% 7.1% 4.5% 2.2% 5.3% 10.6% 3.5% 8.8% 5.5% 9.1% 12.2% 13.7%
Finland 0.4% 0.5% 1.0% 0.4% 0.1% 1.0% 0.4% 0.4% 1.6% 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 1.4% 1.3% 1.8%
France 2.1% 4.3% 6.3% 4.5% 3.3% 7.7% 4.2% 7.6% 5.5% 2.4% 8.8% 11.2% 4.8% 5.5% 4.4%
Germany 8.1% 4.7% 9.9% 8.1% 6.3% 5.4% 7.5% 5.4% 6.5% 5.2% 14.7% 4.9% 4.7% 7.1% 8.4%
Greece 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Ireland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% 0.6% 1.1% 0.8% 1.4% 1.3% 0.9%
Italy 1.0% 0.9% 1.4% 0.9% 1.9% 0.8% 1.7% 1.2% 0.6% 0.3% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 0.9% 0.6%
Japan 65.3% 58.3% 44.2% 39.1% 26.6% 51.5% 37.8% 45.6% 15.8% 36.4% 25.7% 27.9% 21.2% 11.5% 13.0%
Korea 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 3.1% 1.0% 0.9% 1.7%
Luxembourg 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2%
Netherlands 3.9% 4.5% 5.7% 3.8% 2.4% 5.4% 6.8% 7.6% 3.8% 4.1% 2.3% 1.5% 1.3% 2.6% 0.6%
New Zealand 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Norway 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 1.9% 1.9% 0.9% 1.8% 1.6% 2.5% 2.0% 3.1% 1.5% 1.1% 2.8% 1.8%
Portugal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Spain 0.0% 1.7% 2.0% 0.8% 0.9% 2.6% 3.2% 5.1% 2.8% 1.8% 2.4% 2.1% 3.5% 2.1% 2.6%
Sweden 1.0% 3.4% 1.1% 0.8% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 3.5% 0.8% 0.2% 1.4% 0.8%
Switzerland 1.4% 1.5% 1.8% 2.0% 2.7% 1.5% 4.4% 1.8% 2.2% 0.9% 0.6% 1.4% 1.1% 0.4% 0.8%
United Kingdom 3.3% 2.7% 8.1% 4.9% 12.7% 1.3% 2.2% 4.6% 2.6% 3.1% 1.0% 1.0% 0.5% 4.1% 0.2%
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
United Nations 
Peacebuilding 
Fund (UNPBF) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
United States 2.8% 5.8% 7.8% 13.1% 17.9% 9.2% 15.4% 1.8% 23.7% 20.7% 13.3% 28.0% 35.0% 34.1% 32.5%
WFP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Appendix F:  Scatter Plot of Fungibility Study of Logged Independent Variables verse Logged 
Dependent Variable (Agricultural Public Expenditure)   
 
i. Agriculture Aid (log)  against Agricultural Public Expenditures (log) 
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iii. Food Aid Received (log)  against Agricultural Public Expenditures (log) 
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Appendix G:  Scatter Plot of Fiscal Response Study of Logged Independent Variables verse 
Logged Dependent Variable (Tax Revenue)   
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ii. Import Output as a Percentage of GDP (log)  against Tax Revenue as a Percentage of 
GDP(log) 
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vi. GDP Per Capita (log)  against Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP(log) 
 
